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THE EXCLUSION FROM INSURANCE COVERAGE
OF LOSSES CAUSED BY THE INTENTIONAL ACTS
OF THE INSURED: A POLICY IN SEARCH OF A
JUSTIFICATION
James A. Fischer*
I. INTRODUCTION
As a general proposition, one who desires indemnification
through insurance against a certain type of loss or injury cannot ex-
pect to recover the benefit of insurance when he intentionally causes
the very loss or injury against which he sought protection.' Losses
that are consciously and deliberately brought about by the insured
appear to be an inappropriate subject for indemnification through
insurance.2 Even where the actual loss sustained exceeds the amount
of insurance purchased, thus avoiding a claim of "net gain" to the
insured through the intentional act, recovery for losses caused by in-
tentional acts of the insured has traditionally been thought to be in-
consistent with public policy. To allow recovery for such losses
would encourage conduct which is socially undesirable because it is
injurious to others, such as batteries, or simply economically waste-
ful, such as the destruction of property.8
* 1990 by James A. Fischer.
* Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law, Los Angeles, California. I
would like to extend my appreciation to Dean Gerald Uelmen and Professor Kenneth York
who graciously reviewed a draft of this article. I would also like to thank Dean Leigh Taylor
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this article. Errors of course are mine much as I might like to blame others.
1. The refusal to provide coverage for losses intentionally caused by the insured is com-
mon. See R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 5.4(d), at 518 (2d ed. 1988).
2. The relationship between insurance and indemnification has been long recognized in
California. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (West 1972): "Insurance is a contract whereby one
undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising from a contingent or
unknown event." This provision was first adopted in California in 1872 and has not signifi-
cantly changed since. See Stanley v. Columbia Casualty Co., 63 Cal. App. 2d 724, 731-32, 147
P.2d 627, 630-31 (1944) (noting that the 1935 codification of California law worked no signif-
icant change to the predecessor of section 22, former Civil Code section 2527). It should, how-
ever, be noted that indemnification is actually a goal of insurance not a definition of insurance.
Not all indemnification agreements constitute insurance, and not all insurance contracts, for
example life insurance, are fully consistent with a principle of indemnity.
3. Consider this in the context of arson. If a property has a pre-fire fair market value of
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Yet, while the principle of not allowing recovery for losses in-
tentionally caused by the insured is accepted by the courts as a basic
principle, it is done so with difficulty and with occasional diffidence.
This attitude by the courts seems ironic given the proclaimed strong
public policies that gird the principle. As with many basic principles,
it is easier to state the concept than apply it in practice or to recon-
cile the applications.
The first difficulty encountered in applying any insurance ex-
clusion for losses caused by intentional acts of the insured is that we
must first define how broad or narrow an exclusion we really desire.
Most human conduct is volitional and therefore in the broad sense
intentional; it is the consequences of that conduct that are unin-
tended and unforeseen and the issue often is which viewpoint will
encompass our inquiry. For example, assume an insured intention-
ally drives her automobile at 70 mph. Because of her excess speed,
she is unable to stop before striking a pedestrian. Was the injury the
result of intentional act of driving the automobile at an excessive
speed? Probably so. Were the injuries intended? Probably not. This
distinction illustrates a basic viewpoint found in insurance law; the
emphasis is less on the intent to engage in the activity that creates
the potential for injury and more on the intent to bring about the
consequences of that activity. As a general rule, courts do not allow
insurers to avoid coverage where the insured's conduct, though inten-
tional, was not intended to cause injury. The avoidance of coverage
has been generally confined to situations where the insured acted
with the actual intent to cause harm.
A second difficulty in assessing the scope of the intentional act
exclusion is that a leading public policy justification for its adoption,
deterrence of socially proscribed conduct, must now compete with a
conflicting policy of compensating persons who have been injured by
the insured. While under an ex ante approach the policies of deter-
rence and compensation do not conflict, ex post they do. Once the
injury or loss has been sustained, the advancement of the deterrence
interest undermines the compensation interest to the extent that in-
surance provides the sole or major fund available to secure compen-
sation for the victim of the insured's act. The goal of deterring the
$100,000, a transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller serves the economic inter-
ests of both and society at large. Both receive fair value. In the arson situation, that is not the
case. The insured forces the sale on the unwilling insurer. Indeed, the higher the transaction
costs in the willing buyer-willing seller situation, the more desirable is the arson alternative.
Thus, if intentional acts, here arson, do not vitiate coverage, the insured seller may realize a
better deal for himself if he destroys the property than if he sells it.
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insured, and those similarly situated, from engaging in willful mis-
conduct is accomplished by taking away the one source of payment
to which the victim can confidently look for payment of her claim. It
would be surprising if, as the rule of responsibility for intentionally
caused losses and injuries is broadened,' the legal systein's attitude
toward the availability of insurance were unaffected. Compensation
of the insured or the victim of the insured's misconduct is now fre-
quently intoned as a basic policy of insurance law" and this invaria-
bly raises conflicts with the competing policies of deterrence or pun-
ishment of the insured.
Related to the dominance of the compensatory goal, is the trans-
formation of insurance disputes from primarily first party disputes,
i.e., disputes between the insurer and insured over the terms of the
insurance contract, to a significant increase of third party disputes6
involving a claim by the victim against the insurer directly in a direct
action jurisdiction7 or indirectly in a suit against the insured.8 In
these third party actions the court is directly confronted with the
reality that a decision that coverage does not exist may leave the
victim's losses uncompensated. In such cases, the compensation pol-
icy has led to the denial of defenses the insurer would ordinarily
have to a claim asserted against it by the insured. For example, in
Barrera v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.," the insured
had made material misrepresentations on the insurance application
which provided the insurer with the affirmative defense of fraud to
any action for indemnity under the policy by the insured.10 The in-
4. Tobriner & Grodin, Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New In-
dustrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1247 (1967).
5. See Fageol Truck & Coach Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 748, 751, 117 P.2d
669, 671, (1941) (if semantically possible, the insurance contract will be construed so as to
achieve its objective of securing indemnity to the insured for the losses .to which the insurance
relates).
6. See Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521 (1987).
7. Some jurisdictions have allowed direct actions to some third party claimants. See, e.g.,
Territory of Guam, GUAM GOV'T CODE § 43354 (1970); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
22:655, 22:983 (West 1978); Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN., tit. 26, §§ 2001, 2003 (1979);
Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-7-1, 27-7-2 (1979); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
632.24, 632.34, 803.04 (West 1980) (formerly §§ 204.30(4) and 260.11).
8. In California, the standard "no action" provision in the insurance policy generally
insulates the insurer from suit to enforce the indemnification obligations of the policy until the
liability of the insured has been established. See, e.g., Clark v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 113 Cal.
App. 3d 326, 336, 169 Cal. Rptr. 832, 838 (1980). This rule is codified in cases involving
liability policies. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580(b)(2) (West 1988).
9. 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969).
10. CAL. INS. CODE § 359 (West 1975).
1990]
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sured subsequently was involved in an automobile accident with
Barrera. Barrera sued the insured who notified State Farm. State
Farm then conducted an investigation of its insured's insurability,
discovered the misrepresentations, and denied coverage based on
fraudulent procurement. Barrera obtained a judgment against the in-
sured and sued State Farm to realize the indemnity obligation. The
California Supreme Court held that State Farm's delay in investigat-
ing its insured's insurability had caused it to lose its misrepresenta-
tion defense. The Supreme Court noted that such a rule was re-
quired by the compensatory goal that underlies the Financial
Responsibility Law," and outweighed competing public policies
such as deterrence.'
2
Conflicts between competing goals are hardly limited to this
particular area of insurance law. Yet, the competing goals involve an
issue that is of critical importance to claimants, insureds and insur-
ers. Expansion of tort liability has operated to increase the number
of occasions where the intentional act exclusion comes into play. Sex-
ual misconduct torts,'" discrimination and civil rights actions,' 4 bad
faith claims' 5 have all become more visible and, it appears, more
11. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 16000-16560 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989).
12. Barrera, 71 Cal. 2d 659, 669-70, 456 P.2d 674, 683, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 115 (1969)
(citations and footnote omitted). Recently, the California Supreme Court upheld the Robbins-
McAllister Financial Responsibility Act (CAL. VEH. CODE § 16028 (Supp. 1989)) which re-
quires minimum levels of insurance as a condition to operating a motor vehicle on a public
highway. See King v. Meese, 43 Cal. 3d 1217, 743 P.2d 889, 240 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1988). Some
jurisdictions have read the compensatory goal behind mandatory insurance programs as being
so strong as to negate contractual exclusions for losses caused by intentional acts. See, e.g.,
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tringali, 686 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying law of
Hawaii); but see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec, 104 N.J. 1, 514 A.2d 832 (1985). Whether Trin-
gali would be followed in California is unclear. As Malec evidences not all jurisdictions find its
reasoning persuasive. Moreover, it should be noted that the goal of deterrence was not com-
pletely abrogated. As discussed at infra text and accompanying notes 58-61, the insurer may
be subrogated to rights of the victims against the putative insureds, or the insurer may have
direct actions against its putative insured for deceit or breach of the implied convenant of good
faith and fair dealing. See Handel Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 192 Cal. App.
3d 684, 237 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1987).
13. See infra notes 148-66 and accompanying text.
14. Cf Board of Educ. v. CNA Ins. Co., 647 F. Supp. 1495, 1504, n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(noting that the New York State Department of Insurance has indicated that providing cover-
age for defense costs in race discrimination actions actually advances the public interest by
encouraging persons to serve on public and private Boards of Directors). See also Ranger Ins.
Co. v. Bal Harbor Club, Inc., 509 So. 2d 945 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (public policy does
not prohibit insuring against one's own intentional acts of discrimination).
15. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d
1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984); See generally John, Formulating Standards for Awards of
Punitive Damages in the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 2033 (1986);
Sebert, Punitive and Non-Pecuniary Damages in Actions Based Upon Contract: Toward
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frequent visitors to the landscape of litigation. The demise of com-
mon law immunities has further tended to increase the number of
intentional tort claims.16 The increased frequency of the assertion of
claims for intentionally brought about losses, coupled with the in-
creased availability of insurance for misconduct by homeowners, mu-
nicipalities, and businesses, has led to a significant increase in the
importance of the intentional act exclusion of insurance coverage.
The central theme addressed in this article is that the applica-
tion of the intentional act exclusion by lower courts has been di-
vorced from the policy articulated by the California Supreme Court
as underlying the exclusion. The need to reconcile the often compet-
ing goals of deterrence and compensation, both of which clearly un-
derlie the proper application of the intentional act exclusion, are in
many instances ignored by courts in favor of an ad hoc retributivist
approach that is not in keeping with the rules and principles gov-
erning insurance contracts. The result has been the development of a
patchwork of'decisions that in many important areas are not helpful
in predicting how the court will resolve the question of the applica-
tion of an intentional act exclusion to a particular loss, and in those
cases where guidance is provided, such as punitive damages awards
against an insured, the guidance provided is flawed and incorrect.
The approach taken in this article is to discuss these issues in
the context of specific aspects of the application of the intentional act
exclusion. Because insurance law is an area of some uniqueness, Sec-
tion II contains a brief overview of the general judicial approach
toward resolving questions of insurance coverage. An understanding
of this approach is necessary in order to better appreciate the context
in which the intentional act exclusion is construed. Readers familiar
with these principles may move directly to Section III.
Section III of this article examines both the California statutory
intentional act exclusion and the contractual exclusion clauses found
in many insurance policies. The California Supreme Court has ar-
ticulated substantially similar legal definitions of the statutory exclu-
sion and the standard policy exclusion. In each instance the court has
Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565 (1986); Note, Con-
tort: Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsur-
ance Commercial Contracts-Its Existence and Desirability, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510
(1985).
16. Spousal and family immunities had likely foreclosed many intentional tort claims. It
seems there is much truth to the old adage "you only hurt the one you love." Common law
immunities allowed the hurt to go uncompensated. Love truly meant never having to say
you're sorry.
1990]
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emphasized the need to show that the particular "loss" was deliber-
ately intended or designed by the insured in order for the loss to be
excluded from coverage. 17 Unfortunately, lower courts, and on occa-
sion the California Supreme Court, have failed to appreciate the full
significance of that fact and thus have prevented the exclusion from
receiving a principled, consistent application. Section IV addresses
the issue of the "intent" necessary to invoke the intentional act ex-
clusion. While the "deliberate intent or design" test would suggest a
true intent, i.e., subjective intent requirement, California's courts
have opted for ad hoc approaches that, as applied, often act to abne-
gate the role of the insured's actual intent in the determination of
whether the insured intended to cause the loss. This result is again
at odds with the articulated standard of "deliberate intent or design"
adopted by the California Supreme Court.
Finally, in Section V, this article analyzes the special problem
raised by the intentional act exclusion and the issue of coverage for
punitive damages awards and penalties imposed against an insured.
Here again, courts, including the California Supreme Court, have
not been faithful to the "deliberateness" standard rather, they have
adopted an expansive rule of no coverage even though the punitive
damages and/or penalty may have been based on conduct that was
merely negligent or reckless but not intentional in the sense of being
deliberative.
II. THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TOWARD CONSTRUING
INSURANCE CONTRACTS
A. General Rules Governing the Construction of Insurance
Contracts
Insurance companies do not deal with their clients and custom-
ers on the same footing as do many other business entities. The in-
surance business is judicially characterized as "quasi public" and the
relationship between the insurer and the insured is deemed fiduciary
in nature.1 8 This means that the rights and obligations of the insurer
are not determined solely on the basis of rules applied to private
contracts negotiated by individual parties of presumed relatively
17. See infra notes 65-68, 97-99 and accompanying text.
18. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 668, 456 P.2d 674, 681-
82, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 113-14 (1969) (footnote omitted); cf. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686
P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362. The insurer is not, however, a fiduciary as to the insured.
See Barker, Glad & Levy, Is An Insurer A Fiduciary To Its Insured? 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 1
(1989) (differentiating between a fiduciary relationship and a relationship fiduciary in nature).
[Vol. 30
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equal bargaining strength.
This special position of insurance companies has led to the de-
velopment of a laundry list of rules that, individually and collec-
tively, tend to resolve doubts over the scope of coverage in favor of
providing indemnification for losses. 9 The insurance contract is fre-
quently identified as a contract of adhesion.2" Courts are instructed
to construe the insurance contract as a whole and attempt to give
meaning and effect to all words and phrases of the contract but
where two interpretations equally fair may be made, that which af-
fords the greatest measure of protection to the insured should pre-
vail.21 Any "ambiguity" or "uncertainty" in an insurance policy is to
be resolved against the insurer." Insurance contract provisions pro-
viding coverage will be construed liberally whereas provisions re-
stricting or limiting coverage will be construed narrowly.23 The com-
mon, popular and ordinary meaning of words is preferred24 and the
terms of the insurance contract are to be construed in accordance
with the reasonable understanding of a lay person.25 Finally, if se-
19. See Ponder v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 145 Cal. App. 3d 709, 193 Cal. Rptr. 632
(1983), for a Chinese menu display of the rules for construing insurance contracts.
20. Id.; see also Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 879-84, 377 P.2d
284, 295-98, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 184-86 (1962); Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d
111, 121 n.12, 539 P.2d 433, 441 n.12, 123 Cal. Rptr. 649, 659 n.12 (1975); Calfarm Ins. Co.
v. TAC Exterminators, Inc., 172 Cal. App. 3d 564, 218 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1985).
21. Maxon v. Security Ins. Co., 214 Cal. App. 2d 603, 611, 29 Cal. Rptr. 586, 590
(1963).
22. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d 800, 807, 640 P.2d 764, 768, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 628, 632 (1982). This is known as the doctrine of contra proferentum. Holtz Rubber
Co. v. American Star Ins. Co., 14 Cal. 3d 45, 55, 533 P.2d 1055, 1060, 120 Cal. Rptr. 415,
420 (1975). "Ambiguity" is one of the slippery words in the law. Much like other loaded
words, such as "due process," "negligence," "obscenity," etc., the term has a core meaning that
is generally understood. However, it is exceptionally difficult to state rules that control the
correct application of the concept in particular cases. "Ambiguity" determinations appear to be
a mechanism that allows courts to adjust the insurer-insured relationship based on the court's
sense of fairness. Cf Garcia v. Trans Pac. Life Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 3d 900, 904, n.1, 203
Cal. Rptr. 325, 328, n.1 (1984) (the fact that the policy had a very low premium influenced
the court to find for the insurer on the ground that the term was not ambiguous).
23. White v. Western Title Ins., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 881, 710 P.2d 309, 313, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 509, 513 (1985). As a corollary to the above is the rule that while the burden is on the
insured to prove an event is a claim within the scope of the basic coverage, see American Home
Assur. Co. v. Essy, 179 Cal. App. 2d 19, 23, 3 Cal. Rptr. 586, 589 (1960), the burden is on
the insurer to prove that an exclusion applies. See Searle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 3d 425,
437-39, 696 P.2d 1308, 1315-16, 212 Cal. Rptr. 466, 473-74 (1985); Clemmer v. Hartford
Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 880, 587 P.2d 1098, 1105, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285, 292 (1978).
24. Hyer v. Inter-insurance Exch., 77 Cal. App. 343, 246 P. 1055 (1926).
25. This is known as the doctrine of reasonable expectations. Many California cases
apply some form of the doctrine of reasonable expectations. The most recent cases refer to the
reasonable expectations of the insured. See White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870,
881, 710 P.2d 309, 313-14, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509, 513-14 (1985) (title insurance); Garcia v.
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mantically possible, the insurance contract will be construed so as to
achieve its objective of securing indemnity to the insured for the
losses to which the insurance relates. 6 Although the above rules
Truck Ins. Exch., 36 Cal. 3d 426, 438, 682 P.2d 1100, 1106, 204 Cal. Rptr. 435, 441 (1984)
(hospital liability policy); Gyler v. Mission Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 3d 216, 219, 514 P.2d 1219,
1221, 110 Cal. Rptr. 139, 141 (1973) (professional malpractice policy); Century Bank v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 4 Cal. 3d 319, 321, 482 P.2d 193, 194, 93 Cal. Rptr. 569, 570
(1971). Some decisions refer to the reasonable expectations of both the insured and the insurer.
See Holtz Rubber Co. v. American Star Ins. Co., 14 Cal. 3d 45, 56, 533 P.2d 1055, 1061, 120
Cal. Rptr. 415, 421 (1975) (fire policy); Herzog v. National Am. Ins. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 192, 197,
465 P.2d 841, 843, 84 Cal. Rptr. 705, 707 (1970) (vehicle liability policy); Steven v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 868-69, 377 P.2d 284, 288, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176 (1962)
(flight insurance purchased from vending machine). In both Holtz and Steven, the Court con-
strued the policy in favor of coverage-a position consistent with the insured's view. In Herzog
the Court found that neither insurer nor insured had a reasonable expectation of coverage.
None of these cases reflect a rejection of an insured's reasonable expectation of coverage.
It is unclear whether California recognizes the application of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations to determine the meaning of a disputed contract term in the absence of a finding
that the term is ambiguous. In one decision the California Supreme Court did expressly tie the
doctrine of reasonable expectations to a finding of ambiguity:
It is a basic principle of insurance contract interpretation that doubts, uncertain-
ties and ambiguities arising out of policy language ordinarily should be resolved
in favor of the insured in order to protect his reasonable expectation of coverage.
It is also, well established, however, that this rule of construction is applicable
only when the policy language is found to be unclear.
Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 41 Cal. 3d 903, 911, 718 P.2d 920, 924, 226
Cal. Rptr. 558, 562 (1986). As so defined and limited the doctrine of reasonable expectations is
simply one additional rule for construing policy language to determine if it is susceptible to a
pro-coverage construction that would favor the insured. On the other hand, the Supreme Court
did suggest in Wint v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 9 Cal. 3d 257, 507 P.2d 1383, 107 Cal. Rptr.
175 (1973), that the doctrine of reasonable expectations operates independently of a finding of
ambiguity where there was affirmative misdirection of the insured by the insurer: "Under the
circumstances, there being no ambiguity with respect to the exclusion of activities relating to
farming, it remains only for us to determine if under the language of the policy the insurer has
led the insured reasonably to believe that a defense would be provided." Id. at 264, 507 P.2d
at 1388, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 180; see also Garcia, 36 Cal. 3d at 438, 682 P.2d at 1106, 204 Cal.
Rptr. at 441. Several recent court of appeal decisions have, albeit against the general trend of
decisions after Producers Dairy, applied the doctrine of reasonable expectations absent a find-
ing of ambiguity. See Colokathis v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 199 Cal. App. 3d 264,
244 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1988) (review denied but opinion ordered not to be officially published by
Cal. Sup. Ct. on May 19, 1988 pursuant to Rule 976, Cal. R. of Ct.); Hurd v. Republic Ins.,
113 Cal. App. 3d 250, 169 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1981). In Colokathis, the Court applied the doc-
trine for otherwise the insurance policy would have had no economic utility. In Hurd, the
limitation was not conspicuous and thus was not allowed to defeat expectations of coverage
otherwise created. Notwithstanding the language in Producers Dairy, the matter appears to be
open.
The California Supreme Court's decertification policy has not helped to clarify the situa-
tion. Recently, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions is necessarily limited to situations where there is an ambiguity. See Northern Assurance
Co. of Am. v. Carr, 860 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1988) (Producers Dairy not applicable where
exclusion was unambiguous but inconspicuous).
26. Fageol Truck & Coach Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 748, 751, 117 P.2d
19901 INSURANCE COVERAGE 103
have analogies that are applied to contracts in general,2 and not-
withstanding some conflicting rules,28 these pro-coverage rules are
applied with special fervor and determination in the insurance
context.
This pro-coverage bias is perhaps best evidenced by the judicial
approach to construction of the "take away" provisions of the insur-
ance policy. Insurance policies have a common structure. Insurance
policies first define the scope of coverage. Thereafter, the insurance
policy invariably contains the "take-aways." These are commonly
referred to as exclusions.29
For an exclusion to be enforceable against the insured certain
requirements must be met. Most importantly, an exclusion must be
conspicuous, plain and clear.80 The insurer bears a heavy burden to
draft exclusionary clauses in clear language comprehensible to lay
persons."1
661, 669 (1941).
27. Thus, the rule of construction against the policy drafter/insurer (contra proferen-
turn) parallels the general rule that in "cases of uncertainty . . . the language of a contract
should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1654 (West 1985); 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CON-
TRACTS §§ 698-704 (9th ed. 1987). Similarly, the doctrine of reasonable expectations parallels
general rules of contract interpretation that: (1) look to the circumstances under which the
contract was made (CAL. CIv. CODE § 1647 (West 1985); 1 B. WITKIN, supra § 688); (2)
seek to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties (CAL. CIV. CODE § 1636 (West 1985),
1 B. WITKIN, supra § 684: "If it is shown that the words were used to conceal rather than to
express the true intent of the parties, the court will look through the form to the substance");
and (3) endeavor to give the contract a reasonable construction (CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1643,
3541 (West 1985)).
28. There are always counter-reformation rules. See, e.g., Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta,
30 Cal. 3d 800, 807, 640 P.2d 764, 768, 180 Cal. Rptr. 628, 632 (1982) ([Tlhe contract term
is not ambiguous when its meaning is plain and susceptible of only one construction. In such
circumstances the contract term must be construed consistent with that meaning unless some
other rule requires otherwise); Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d
423, 432, 296 P.2d 801, 806 (1956) (except as otherwise required by statute, the insurer has
the right to limit the coverage of a policy issued by it and, when it has done so, the plain
language of the contract limitation must be respected).
29. The term "exclusion" is technically imprecise but courts generally do not examine
the nuance of the distinction between conditions precedent to coverage and provisions taking
away coverage.
30. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 273, 419 P.2d 168, 174, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104,
110 (1966).
31. Stewart v. Estate of Bohnert, 101 Cal. App. 3d 978, 162 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1980):
The provisions and exceptions in an insurance policy must be strictly construed
against the insurer, who is bound to use language clear to the ordinary mind. If
the insurer would create an exception to the general import of the principal
coverage clauses, the exception must be phrased in clear and unmistakable lan-
guage. Where a policy contains a sea of print defining the promised benefits, an
exclusionary clause incidentally inserted in the policy merely creates an ambigu-
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These rules evidence a favoritism toward a particular class of
litigants, here insureds, that is not seen on a sustained basis in most
areas of the law. While the limits of these rules remain untested in
California, 2 there clearly exists a body of rules, biased in favor of
insureds, which are consistently applied to sustain a finding that the
loss is covered." Moreover, these "rules" are flexible enough to re-
quire, as a foundation for application, little more than an ability by
the insured to make a plausible claim that the loss should be deemed
covered by the insurance contract, regardless of whether the loss was
deliberately or accidentally brought about.
ity and should not be literally interpreted so as to disappoint the reasonable and
normal expectations of the insured.
Id. at 988, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 130 (citations omitted). See also Migliore v. Sheet Metal Work-
ers' Welfare Plan, 18 Cal. App. 3d 201, 204, 95 Cal. Rptr. 669, 671 (1971).
32. Compare Cal-Farms Ins. Co. v. TAC Exterminators, Inc., 172 Cal. App. 3d 564,
579, 218 Cal. Rptr. 407, 415 (1985) (stating the traditional rule that acceptance of the policy
binds the insured and the insured is charged with knowledge of the contents of the policy,
including exclusions) with Logan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 988,
116 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1974):
We glean from Steven and its progeny (Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58
Cal. 2d 862, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263,
54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966); Young v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 272 Cal. App.
2d 453, 77 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1969)) a general principle of public policy as fol-
lows: In the case of standardized insurance contracts, exceptions and limitations
on coverage that the insured could reasonably expect, must be called to his at-
tention, clearly and plainly, before the exclusions will be interpreted to relieve
the insurer of liability or performance.
Logan, 41 Cal. App. 3d at 995, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 532 (footnote omitted). Relying on Logan,
the court in Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Purdie, 145 Cal. App. 3d 57, 193 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1983)
stated that the traditional rule is suspect and not in harmony with today's law governing
exclusions in insurance contracts. Id. at 65, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 252. The court held: "We
conclude, therefore, the mere receipt of the insurance policy in this case, which is shown by
substantial evidence, does not serve to charge the insured with constructive knowledge of the
firearm exclusion." Id. at 65, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 252-53. However, in a recent case where the
court refused to apply an exclusion from coverage that had not been pointed out to the insured,
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Velasco, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1441, 240 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1987), the
Supreme Court ordered the opinion decertified. The difficulty here lies in the conflict between
the "duty to point out" rule and the rule that neither the insurer nor its agents have a positive
obligation to advise the insured regarding the "best" coverage the insured ought to obtain given
the insured's needs and circumstances. Cf Schultz Steel Co. v. Rowan-Wilson, Inc., 187 Cal.
App. 3d 513, 231 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1986) (insurer has no duty to advise); Jones v. Grewe, 189
Cal. App. 3d 950, 234 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1987) (broker has no duty to advise). A fine line exists
between advising the insured and pointing out what the policy does and does not cover. The
California Supreme Court's decertification policy means that for now that fine line remains
blurry.
33. The above is surely not exhaustive of pro-coverage rules applied by California
courts. Indeed, almost every area of insurance law enjoys or suffers from, depending on your
point of view, pro-coverage rules.
INSURANCE COVERAGE
B. Coverage Clauses: Accidents, Occurrences and Intentional Acts
As the preceding section demonstrates, the legal system takes a
rather expansive approach toward coverage issues and a rather nar-
row, at times almost hostile, approach to language in the insurance
contract which takes away what an earlier part of the policy gave or
seemed to give. This dichotomy is important to resolving coverage
questions involving losses caused by intentional acts.
A standard property or liability insurance policy will normally
attempt in two ways to avoid coverage for losses caused by inten-
tional acts. The coverage clause will be drafted so as to encompass
only unintentional conduct. Thus, an insurance policy may limit cov-
erage for intentional acts by adopting language from the Insurance
Service Office8 ' ISO Standard Form which, using "occurrence" as
the insured event, defines "occurrence" as an accident which occurs
during the policy period resulting in bodily injury or property dam-
age "neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the in-
sured." Alternatively, the effort to avoid coverage for losses caused
by the insured's intentional acts is framed as an exclusion, excluding
coverage for injury or loss "expected or intended from the standpoint
of the insured."
An initial question thus becomes whether placement of lan-
guage seeking to avoid coverage for losses caused by the insured's
intentional acts in a coverage clause or as an exclusion is legally
significant. Although one California decision suggests that placement
is legally irrelevant,88 case law suggests otherwise. For example, in
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.," the California Supreme Court sub-
jected an exclusion for losses caused by the insured's intentional acts
to the rigorous rules applicable to exclusions generally. The policy
language in Gray excluded "injury or damage caused intentionally
by or at the direction of the insured." This was deemed to be ambig-
uous. The court held that the juxtapositioning of the terms "inten-
tional" and "at the direction of" could cause the average insured to
believe that the exclusion only apples to "collusive, willful or
34. The Insurance Service Office is a national organization which among other func-
tions uses country-wide loss experience to determine "appropriate" risk classifications and pro-
poses appropriate policy language to capture those desired risk classifications in insurance poli-
cies made available to insureds by insurers.
35. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Employer's Ins. Co., 159 Cal.
App. 3d 277, 290 n.8, 205 Cal. Rptr. 460, 469 n.8 (1984) ("[tjhe cases make no distinction
[between the two forms] for the purpose of determining coverage").
36. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
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planned actions beyond the notion of intentional tort." 7 Since it was
arguable on the facts in Gray that the insured's conduct while inten-
tional was not preconceived in the sense of being premeditated or
designed, the exclusion did not apply. 8
On the other hand, where the insurer places the limitation in
the coverage clause, some success in limiting coverage has been ob-
tained. Thus, in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Superior
Court, 9 the court attached particular significance to the location of
the restriction:
Here, the express terms of the policy extend coverage only for
claims against the insured "resulting" from an accidental
event." In its plain and ordinary sense, "accidental" means
"arising from extrinsic causes [;] occurring unexpectedly or by
chance [; or] happening without intent or through carelessness."
(WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICT. 49 (1983)). The
policy itself states that "the accidental event . . . must be some-
thing [the insured] didn't expect or intend to happen.'
By framing the issue as one of coverage rather than exclusion, the
insurer may hope to avoid the hostile judicial reaction toward exclu-
sions 1 but whether this will succeed in fact or is worth the risk of
the limitation on coverage being considered not sufficiently conspicu-
ous is problematic.'"
37. Id. at 273, 419 P.2d at 174, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
38. Gray is complicated for purposes here because it arose in the context of the defense
of the insured, a contractual obligation of the standard liability insurance policy.
39. 161 Cal. App. 3d 1199, 208 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1984).
40. Id. at 1202, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
41. Id. at 1203 n.1, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 7 n.l. See also Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Whitaker,
181 Cal. App. 3d 532, 226 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1986):
[Hiere, the insurer only promises to indemnify or defend actions involving bod-
ily injury caused by an accident resulting in bodily injury neither expected nor
intended by the insured. It was therefore the appellants' burden to show they
came within this definition. All the evidence they have adduced shows the act by
their assignor, Knighten, was intentional. An intentional act is not an "acci-
dent" within the plain meaning of the word.
Id. at 537, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 437-38. Where the exclusion explicitly defines the scope of
coverage, there is authority for transferring the burden of disproving the application of the
exclusion to the insured. See Zuckerman v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 42 Cal. 2d 460,
473, 267 P.2d 777, 784 (1954); but see Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 880,
587 P.2d 1098, 1106, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285, 293 (1978) (Zuckernan not applied where exclu-
sion in question was present with other exclusions).
42. The nuance here is well illustrated by Coastal Plains Feeders, Inc. v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 545 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1977):
We recognize that there is some Alabama authority for the broad proposition
that, where the general liability clause of an insurance policy itself contains an
exclusion, the insured bears the burden of pleading and proving that he is not
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By combining coverage and exclusion concepts into a unitary
clause, the insurer runs the risk that the court may identify the re-
striction as an exclusion but refuse to enforce or apply it because it is
not conspicuous.' The argument that the exclusion within the cov-
erage clause is inconspicuous is enhanced if the policy is sold with
reference to other materials, such as brochures, which do not ade-
quately disclose the limited coverage, or if the policy is sold in a
manner, i.e., by vending machine or through the mail, such that op-
portunity to obtain the assistance of an agent or broker in explaining
the scope and extent of coverage is negated. Moreover, the limitation
may not be in the first coverage clause the insured encounters even if
within the exclusion; although where an exclusion is stated in a separate clause,
the insurer bears the burden of pleading and proving the applicability of the
exclusion. E.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Beason, 229 Ala. 140, 141-142, 155
So. 530, 531-32 (1934); Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Swink, 222 Ala. 496, 498,
132 So. 728, 729 (1931); see Ruffalo's Trucking Serv., Inc. v. Nat'l Ben-Frank-
lin Ins. Co., 243 F.2d 949, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1957) (accord) (New York law). We
note, however, that some states which have considered policies of the precise
kind under consideration here, insuring against "theft, but excluding mysterious
disappearance," have concluded that the insurer bears the burden of proving
applicability of the exclusion. Lovas v. St. Paul Ins. Cos., 240 N.W.2d 53, 62(N.D. 1976); see Long v. Glidden Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 215 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Iowa
1974). This court, interpreting under Florida law an "all-risks" policy with a
liability clause that excluded recovery for mysterious disappearance, reached the
same conclusion. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Balogh, 272 F.2d 889, 891-92 (5th
Cir. 1959); see Betty v. Liverpool and London and Globe Ins. Co., 310 F.2d
308, 310-11 (4th Cir. 1962) (accord). At least one other court, though, has sug-
gested that it would place the burden of negating mysterious disappearance
under policies like the one here on the insured. See Baugher v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 214 Kan. 891, 900-901, 522 P.2d 401, 409 (1974) (by implication).
Id. at 451 n.6.
43. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. See also Miller v Elite Ins. Co., 100
Cal. App. 3d 739, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1980):
The exclusionary clause in Elite's policy appears in the second column of two
columns of print, approximately one inch below other phrases. The paragraph
on exceptions is in no way distinguished from any others in the document. The
same type-face is used and the placement of the paragraph in the middle of the
document is not likely to attract attention.
[Tihe exclusion clause is open to more than one interpretation and is inconspic-
uously placed in a standardized contract.
Id. at 752, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 329. See also Northern Assurance Co. of Am. v. Carr, 860 F.2d
934 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying doctrine of reasonable expectations to unambiguous but incon-
spicuous language in exclusion clause in the insurance policy).
Courts have deemed exclusions to be inconspicuous where they were not in a section
labeled exclusions and were placed on an overcrowded page (see Schmidt v. Pacific Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 735, 740, 74 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1969) ("dense packing")), or in a
section titled "General Limitations" but again in a "dense pack" format. Ponder v. Blue Cross
of S. Cal., 145 Cal. App. 3d 709, 722, 193 Cal. Rptr. 632, 639 (1983).
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the insured reads the policy. As noted earlier, it is not uncommon for
the insurance policy to use a bifurcated definition of coverage. The
initial definition may use the concept of occurrence as the trigger for
coverage. "Occurrence" in turn is then defined as an "accident
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."
In such a setting the concept of occurrence may be treated as the
coverage clause and the restrictive definition of occurrence as an
exclusion.
Where the term "accident" or "occurrence" is treated as the
trigger for coverage, courts have applied a most liberal standard.
While the term "accident" is generally conceded not to be ambigu-
ous, this is not to say that it has a settled or certain meaning. In
Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co.," the
California Supreme Court acknowledged that "[n]o all-inclusive def-
inition of the word 'accident' can be given." And while two Califor-
nia decisions hold that the term "accident" is ambiguous,4 that posi-
tion has consistently been rejected by most California courts."
In California, the term "accident" has been deemed to be the
antithesis of an intended act.4 In Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul
Mercury Indemnity Co.,"' the court defined "accident" as follows:
It has been defined "as 'a casualty-something out of the usual
course of events and which happens suddenly and unexpectedly
and without design of the person injured.' " It " 'includes any
event which takes place without the foresight or expectation of
the person acted upon or affected by the event.' " "Accident, as
a source and cause of damage to property, within the terms of
an accident policy, is an unexpected, unforeseen, or undesigned
happening or consequences from either ,a known or an unknown
cause."'
49
44. 51 Cal. 2d 558, 563, 334 P.2d 881, 884 (1959).
45. See Sylla v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 895, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 38 (1976); cf Oil Base, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d 378, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 594 (1969) (term accident may refer to either the time the injury occurs or the time the
events which cause the injury occur).
46. Hallmark Ins. Co., Inc. v. Superior Court, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 1018-19, 247
Cal. Rptr. 638, 639-40 (1988); see also Foremost Ins. Co. v. Eanes, 134 Cal. App. 3d 566,
184 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1982) (incomplete briefing led to Sylla's definition of "accident").
47. See Zuckerman v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 42 Cal. 2d 460, 473, 267
P.2d 777, 785 (1954); Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 181 Cal. App. 3d 532, 537, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 435, 437 (1986).
48. 51 Cal. 2d 558, 334 P.2d 881 (1959).
49. Id. at 563-64, 334 P.2d at 884 (citation omitted). This is not to suggest that any
unintended damage from an intentional act causes the insured's conduct to be deemed "acci-
dental" for purposes of insurance law. Although the line of demarcation cannot be drawn with
precision, courts tend to analyze the "act"-"effect" continuum not abstractly but functionally,
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Thus, in California the legal definition of "accident" and the stan-
dard policy language defining an accident as an "occurrence neither
expected nor intended" are synonymous.
Another factor which tends to distance the concept of accident
from that of intentional conduct is the time of reference. An accident
occurs when the actual injury occurs; not at the time the event which
created the potential for future injury occurs.50 The decision to take
certain action or engage in certain activity is ordinarily volitional,
intentional conduct. One may intentionally act in a way that fails to
evidence a proper appreciation of the risks involved to oneself or to
others. If this was the central focus of inquiry it would be analyti-
cally more difficult to avoid characterizing such conduct as "inten-
tional." By focusing on the injurious event, emphasis is placed on the
foreseeability of the loss rather than the intent to do the act that
creates the potential for loss. Consequently, an intentional act is con-
duct or activity in which one engages knowing or intending that an
injury will occur.5
A significant, albeit imprecise, divide separates accidents from
intentional acts in the standard insurance policy. The coverage
clause, subject to all the pro-coverage, pro-insured rules identified
earlier, is framed by reference to the injurious event." 2 The initial
particularly with respect to the nature of the "risk" assumed by the insurer. See Meyer v.
Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 321, 327-28, 43 Cal. Rptr. 542, 547 (1965) in
which the court stated:
A policy of insurance should not be so interpreted as to remove from the cover-
age a risk against which the circumstances under which and the purposes for
which the policy was written indicate the insured intended to protect him-
self. . . . The insured knew and presumptively the insurer knew that in the
drilling of water wells vibrations are set up in the surrounding soil and both
parties knew that there was a risk that it was possible that such vibrations
might cause damage to others. Certainly this risk was one clearly within the
contemplation of the parties and the fact that the vibrations were intentionally
caused and that they might possibly cause damage did not make the damage, if
it occurred, intentional damage or an expected and therefore nonaccidental con-
sequence of the insured's operation of its business.
50. See, e.g., Schrillo Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 181 Cal. App. 3d 766,
773, 226 Cal. Rptr. 717, 712 (1986); Maples v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 83 Cal. App. 3d
641, 647-50, 148 Cal. Rptr. 80, 83-85 (1978).
51. If the coverage clause simply speaks to an "occurrence" as the insured event, then
coverage may extend both to the event creating the potential for future injury and the injuri-
ous event. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Sam Harris Constr. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 409, 413, 583
P.2d 1335, 1337, 149 Cal. Rptr. 292, 294 (1978).
52. The event may be defined by reference to its inherent characteristic (e.g., death), or
as is most commonly the case in property and liability policies, by reference to how it came
about (e.g., loss by fire but not by windstorm). Thus, in many cases, coverage claims are
framed by causation rules, which also carry a pro-coverage orientation. See generally Brewer,
Concurrent Causation in Insurance Contracts, 59 MIcH. L. REV. 1141 (1961); see Houser &
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focus is on whether the insured's loss is a covered event, as defined
by the coverage clause. If it is a covered event, then the focus shifts to
the "take-away" provisions, which are subject to the rules of restric-
tive application noted earlier. Moreover, in assessing the scope of the
exclusion for intentional acts, emphasis is not on the intent to do the
act that resulted in the loss but on the intent to realize the actual
consequences of the act or knowledge that the activity engaged in
will lead to the realization of the loss actually incurred. The differ-
ent approaches to identifying the requisite degree and kind of intent
or knowledge necessary to trigger the intentional act exclusion is the
focus of this article.
III. THE EXCLUSION OF INTENTIONAL ACTS OF THE INSURED
FROM COVERAGE
As a general rule insurance policies attempt to exclude coverage
for losses caused by the intentional acts of the insured. In California
the exclusion is accomplished either by language in the policy or by
reliance on Insurance Code section 533 which exonerates insurers of
losses caused by the willful act of the insured,5 3 or both. As a part of
the Insurance Code, section 533 is incorporated into every insurance
contract.54 Consequently, the resolution of the issue of the insurer's
exoneration because the loss was allegedly due to the insured's inten-
tional act requires the analysis of both Insurance Code section 533
and the insurance policy's express language limiting policy liability
for intentional act.
A. The Statutory Exclusion
California Insurance Code section 533 states a general exclusion
for losses caused by the willful acts of the insured. The statute is
Kent, Concurrent Causation in First Party Insurance Claims: Consumers Cannot Afford
Concurrent Causation, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 573 (1986); Litsey, Property Insurance Cover-
age and Policy Exclusions: Problems of Multiple Causation, FED'N. INS. COUNS. Q. 415
(Summer, 1985).
53. See e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1972): "An insurer is not liable for a loss
caused by the willful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the
insured, or of the insured's agents or others." See also CAL. Csv. CODE § 1668 (West 1972):
"Certain contracts unlawful. All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to
exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or prop-
erty of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the
law."
54. Evans v. Pacific Indem. Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 537, 540, 122 Cal. Rptr. 680, 682
(1975); Maxon v. Security Ins. Co., 214 Cal. App. 2d 603, 615, 29 Cal. Rptr. 586, 592
(1963).
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based on the stated public policy objectives of (1) prohibiting indem-
nification for intentional misconduct,5" and (2) preventing the en-
couragement of willful tortious acts."6 If the insured is able to shift
the cost of his willful misconduct from himself to his insurer, the
insured might be less inclined to avoid engaging in such undesirable
conduct." Moreover, to the extent tort law retains vestiges of retri-
bution or punishment of the tortfeasor as end purposes, indemnifica-
tion is thought to interfere with the achievement of those goals. The
"no indemnification" policy is predicated on the desire to deny any
economic benefit to the insured whose intentional misconduct causes
a loss.
In this context, however, the policy objective and the settings in
which the exclusion for intentional acts arise do not coincide, result-
ing in a mismatch between objectives and result. To equate the in-
tentional act exclusion with the purpose of denying "benefits" to
wrongdoers is to render it essentially superfluous. The practice of
denying wrongdoers the fruits of their wrongs is well-recognized in
law."" More importantly, the "no indemnification" policy rests on
the erroneous assumption that payment in these cases benefits the
insured. The reality is otherwise. An insurer who pays a claim
brought about by the intentional misconduct of the insured should be
subrogated to the rights of the claimant against the insured .5  Thus,
55. Arenson v. National Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 81, 83-84, 286 P.2d 816,
818 (1955). See also supra note 53 for the text of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 1989); see
generally Farbstein & Stillman, Insurance for the Commission of Intentional Torts, 20 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1219, 1246-47 (1969).
56. Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 648, 394 P.2d 571, 577-78, 39
Cal. Rptr. 731, 737-38 (1964).
57. This is often referred to as "moral hazard," a problem endemic to insurance law.
See generally KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 1, § 6.6(e)(3).
58. See generally A. DENNING, THE CHANGING LAW (1953): "Underlying all the law
of restitution is the conception that no one should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of his
neighbour." Id. at 53, quoted in G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 5 n.16
(1978).
59. Subrogation applies where one who is not a volunteer pays a debt for which another
is primarily responsible and which in equity and good conscience should be borne by the
debtor. See Offer v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 114, 119-20, 228 P. 11, 13 (1924).
There is an often-applied rule that an insurer cannot be subrogated to a claim against its
own insured as would be the case if the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the victim, a
third-party claimant against the insured. See 16 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW
§ 61:133 (rev. 2d ed. 1983). Where, however, the payment is caused by the intentional miscon-
duct of the insured; authority exists for allowing subrogation by the insurer against its insured.
The theory here is that while subrogation normally only arises with respect to the rights of the
insured against third persons to whom the insurer owes no duty, where the insured's conduct
is such as to allow for rescission of the insurance contract, as between insurer and "putative"
insured, no duty exists. See Frank Briscoe Co. v. Georgia Sprinklers Co., 713 F.2d 1500 (11th
19901
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a solvent insured could not "benefit" by the payment of the claim.
Any payment under the policy would go to the victim with the in-
surer in turn subrogated to the victim's claim against the insured to
the amount of the payment. If the insured is insolvent the "benefit"
argument becomes a makeweight.
There are, of course, limitations on the insurer's right of subro-
gation°.and rules affecting the subrogated insurer's priority vis-a-vis
claims of other creditors of the insured, 1 including the injured par-
ties, to full payment of their claims against the insured. These vari-
ables will affect the benefit calculation.6" It is unnecessary to engage
in a discussion of subrogation rules or to consider how these concepts
would apply to the case of the insurer asserting a subrogated claim
against its insured. It is sufficient to note that since the normal rule
of no subrogation against the insured can be disregarded in this con-
text, the essential premise that the intentional act exclusion must al-
ways be enforced to prevent the wrongful benefiting of the insured is
erroneous.
Cir. 1983). Hence, when the insurer pays the claim of the victim of the "putative" insured's
misdeeds, the insurer is subrogated to that victim's claim against the "putative" insured. See
Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 388 A.2d 603 (1978) (deliberate arson fire
resulting in unintended loss of life); see also Note, Conflicts Regarding the "No Subrogation
Against The Insured" Rule, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 811 (1979-80). Professor Kenneth York sug-
gests that, as a consequence of this rule being adopted insurers ought to focus on the insured's
solvency as an underwriting consideration. Clearly, to the extent deterrence values do underlie
the intentional act exclusion they would be enhanced if the fiscal impact of an insured's inten-
tional misconduct were actually visited on the insured.
60. The most prominent limitation is that the insurance contract may, by its terms, limit
subrogation. See generally Kimball & Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60
MicH. L. REV. 841 (1962). Subrogation may also be limited by equating it with an impermis-
sible assignment of personal injury claims. Cf Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 354
P.2d 1073, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1960) (no subrogation to personal injury claim). Fifield obvi-
ously limits many subrogation actions that could be brought since many victims of intentional
misconduct possess purely personal injury claims. In such cases, the insurer may eschew subro-
gation and rely on unjust enrichment of the insured. See, e.g., Kossian v. American Nat'l Ins.
Co., 254 Cal. App. 2d 647, 62 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1967).
61. In the typical case, the insurer acquires an "equitable lien" on the insured's recov-
ery from which its "claim" must be satisfied. See, e.g., Bernardini v. Home & Auto. Ins. Co.,
64 Il. App. 2d 465, 212 N.E.2d 499 (1965); Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 81
Nev. 361, 404 P.2d 10 (1965); Collins v. Blue Cross, 213 Va. 540, 193 S.E.2d 782 (1973).
Since in the typical case the insured's claim against the third party is prosecuted at the in-
sured's expense, he is entitled to charge the insurer for the value of the benefit conferred. See
Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 57 Cal. App. 3d 458, 129 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1976).
62. See Kelly v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 194 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8, 239 Cal. Rptr. 259, 262
(1987) (uninsured motorist coverage: insured receives full compensation before insurer recovers
on its claim of subrogation). Insurers' efforts to alter these rules by contrary language in the
insurance contract have been unsuccessful in California. Cf American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sea-
board Sur. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 192, 196, 318 P.2d 84, 87 (1957) ("The principle of equita-
ble subrogation overrides the terms of the insurance policies").
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The assumption that the intentional act exclusion is needed to
prevent all insureds from reaping windfalls from any insurer is in-
correct. Application of the exclusion as a bar to coverage in many
instances simply punishes the victim for the misconduct of the in-
sured. The punishment rationale assumes too much. The primary
objective that an intentional act exclusion can legitimately serve is
one of deterrence and, perhaps incidentally, cost containment since it
allows insurers to avoid those costs associated with subrogation ac-
tions that would be brought against solvent insureds."8 A punishment
goal does underlie the intentional act exclusion but it is a more lim-
ited goal of placing ultimate responsibility for the loss with solvent
insureds, rather than the broad "no benefit" rationale. The law's
compensation goal is furthered by providing the victim of the in-
sured's misconduct with the insurance proceeds. The punishment
goal is vindicated by permitting the insurer to recover its outlay from
its solvent insured. Since it is only in this latter setting that punish-
ment has any real meaning, it should be confined to that situation.
Countermanding the policies of deterrence, punishment and
cost-containment underlying Insurance Code section 533 is the gen-
eral pro-coverage orientation of the courts and the desire that third
party victims of the insured's misconduct be compensated for their
losses.64 This has led to a restrictive gloss being placed on the statute
in two recent decisions. In Peterson v. Superior Court,6" the Califor-
nia Supreme Court stated that Insurance Code section 533's concept
of a willful act does not extend to an act "performed without intent
to harm . . . [but which] nevertheless result[s] in injury and possible
exposure to punitive damages because it was done with conscious
disregard for the rights or safety of others."6 In Clemmer v. Hart-
ford Insurance Co.,67 the California Supreme Court referred to and
approved a "clear line of authority in [California] to the effect that
even an act which is 'intentional' or 'willful within the meaning of
traditional tort principles will not exonerate the insurer from liabil-
63. There are, of course, situations where insureds seek to avail themselves or others of
the benefits of insurance by intentionally seeking to bring about a "covered" loss. An arson fire
or suicide are two obvious examples. These situations are invariably limited to first party
transactions between insured and insurer. In such cases the compensation policy noted earlier
may have less importance than in the third party transaction where the insured has inflicted
injury on a third person and both the third person and the insured look to the insurer for
compensation to cover the loss.
64. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
65. 31 Cal. 3d 147, 642 P.2d 1305, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1982).
66. Id. at 159, 642 P.2d at 1311, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
67. 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1978).
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ity under Insurance Code section 533 unless it is done with a
'preconceived design to inflict injury.' "68
The basis in precedent for this judicial gloss may be ques-
tioned.69 The "preconceived injury" language flows from a view of
Insurance Code section 533 apparently first espoused in Nuffer v.
Insurance Co. of North America.0 In Nuffer the court treated the
statutory exclusion for willful acts as if it were a contractual exclu-
sion and consequently applied the restrictive rules applicable to in-
surance policy exclusion, most importantly the rule of contra profer-
entum.71 Implicit in the Nuffer decision is the finding that the term
"willful" as used in Insurance Code section 533 is ambiguous for
there must be some flexibility in the language of the exclusion in
order to give it a narrow construction. If the language is unambigu-
ous and only one construction of the language is possible there is
simply no role for the doctrine of contra proferentum. Ironically, the
argument that Insurance Code section 533 is ambiguous was rejected
when it was specifically presented in Evans v. Pacific Indemnity
Co.
7 2
The Nuffer observation that the statutory exclusion (Insurance
Code section 533) should be treated merely as a contractual exclu-
sion was accepted without critical analysis by the California Su-
preme Court in Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co.7 ' The court's
approval of Nuffer was so casual that it ignored the inherent incon-
sistency between Nuffer's implicit finding that Insurance Code sec-
tion 533 is ambiguous and the rejection of that position in Evans.74
That Insurance Code section 533 should be treated as merely
the equivalent of a contractual exclusion and subjected to the same
rules that govern the latter is questionable. The reason why contrac-
68. Id. at 887, 587 P.2d at 1110, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
69. Cf Hale v. Morgan, 22 Cal. 3d 388, 584 P.2d 512, 149 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1978) ("iI~t
is well settled that the terms 'willful' or 'willfully,' when applied in a penal statute, require
only that the illegal act or omission occur 'intentionally,' without regard to motive or ignorance
of the act's prohibited character.") But cf. text and note 202, infra, discussing "malice" ele-
ment of Insurance code section 533.
70. 236 Cal. App. 2d 349, 45 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1965).
71. Id. at 356, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
72. 49 Cal. App. 3d 537, 541, 122 Cal. Rptr. 680, 682 (1975) (Insurance Code section
533 is not ambiguous; "[Slection 533 ... reflects the very sound and long lasting policy . . .
which disapproves of contracts which directly or indirectly exempt anyone from personal re-
sponsibility for his own willful injury to another").
73. 22 Cal. 3d 865, 880, 587 P.2d 1098, 1105, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285, 292 (1978).
74. The court in Clemmer cited both Nuffer and Evans in support of its treatment of
Insurance Code section 533 as merely "the equivalent of an exclusionary or exculpatory
clause." Id.
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tual exclusions are subjected to rigorous scrutiny is due to the char-
acterization of insurance contracts as being adhesive. The Insurance
Code is not, however, a contract. The fact that the Code's provisions
are deemed a part of the insurance contract by operation of law
hardly supports treating them the same as contract provisions placed
in the agreement by the party with superior bargaining power.
Whether a contract is deemed to be adhesive turns on the man-
ner in which the contractual relationship was formed. 5 In the insur-
ance setting, the pro-insured, pro-coverage rules rest on the generally
presumed76 unequal relationship between insurer and insured:
The principle that ambiguities in insurance policies must be
strictly construed against the insurer stems primarily from a
recognition of the typical relationship between the parties. Ordi-
narily, a court is faced with a conflict between the purchaser of
an insurance contract and the insurance carrier. In such cases it
is typically the carrier who drafts the insurance contract, unilat-
erally, and for policy reasons it is held responsible for any am-
biguity in the language. And in the typical situation the policy
represents a contract of adhesion 'entered into between the two
parties of unequal bargaining strength, expressed in the lan-
guage of a standardized contract, written by the more powerful
bargainer to meet its own needs and offered to the weaker party
on a "take it or leave it" basiS. 7
The nexus between the identification of insurance contracts as
contracts of adhesion and the creation of pro-insured, pro-coverage
rules can be seen in those few cases where the facts do not plainly
evidence that the case for a contract of adhesion exists. Thus, in
Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital,78 the California Supreme
Court held that the special rules of construction applicable to con-
tracts of adhesion did not apply to bar enforcement of an arbitration
clause against an employee participant in a health care policy en-
tered into between Kaiser and the Board of Administration of the
Public Employees Retirement Plan. In Madden, the insurer suc-
ceeded in negating what now appears to be a legal presumption that
75. Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 882, 377 P.2d 284, 297, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 172, 185 (1962) (footnote omitted).
76. In many cases, the identity between insurance policies and adhesion contracts is
simply stated by the court. See, e.g., Chodos v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 126 Cal. App. 3d 86,
98, 178 Cal. Rptr. 831, 837-38 (1981) (automobile policy is a contract of adhesion).
77. Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exch., 36 Cal. 3d 426, 438, 682 P.2d 1100, 1105-06, 204 Cal.
Rptr. 435, 440-41 (1984) (quoting Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54
Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966)).
78. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 711, 552 P.2d 1178, 1185, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882, 889 (1976).
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insurance policies are contracts of adhesion by showing that the par-
ties to the contract were of equal bargaining strength. 9 In Continen-
tal Insurance Co. v. Highland Insurance Co.,80 where the dispute
was between two insurance companies, the court found it was only
just to construe the relevant contractual terms as written.81
A like result has been achieved in cases where the disputed pol-
icy term was drafted or proposed by the insured, thus evidencing
that bargaining in fact did exist and undermining the case for the
application of the pro-insured, pro-coverage rules. 82 In a case where
the insured was represented by a specialized risk manager who was
in fact able to "bargain" with the insurer over the terms and condi-
tions of the insurance contract, the pro-insured, pro-coverage rules
were not applied.8"
The driving force between the recognition of pro-insured, pro-
coverage rules is the identification of the insurance policy as a con-
tract of adhesion. Should, therefore, the same rules be applied to
contract provisions which are not a product of the insurer's advanta-
geous relationship vis-a-vis the insured but rather are a result of the
79. Conversely the absence of such equality requires the application of the special pro-
insured, pro-coverage rules. See Hannon Eng'g, Inc. v. Reim, 126 Cal. App. 3d 415, 426, 179
Cal. Rptr. 78, 84 (1981) ("plan was not the product of a term-by-term negotiation between
the parties herein. It was established by Hannon . . . for the benefit of the company's salaried
employees"); Beynon v. Garden Grove Medical Group, 100 Cal. App. 3d 698, 705, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 146, 150 (1980) ("no evidence that the agreement was negotiated by parties having a
parity of bargaining strength or that plaintiff had a realistic opportunity to bargain"); Jones v.
Crown Life Ins. Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 630, 637-38, 150 Cal. Rptr. 375, 378-79 (1978). In
each of these cases the arbitration clause was not enforced.
80. 793 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1986).
81. Id. at 226 (applying California law).
82. See Young's Mkt. Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., 4 Cal. 3d 309, 316, 481
P.2d 817, 821-22, 93 Cal. Rptr. 449, 453-54 (1971).
83. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 182 Cal. App. 3d 462, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 203 (1986):
Here the typical relationship (unequal bargaining strength, use of standardized
language by more powerful insurer-draftsman) simply did not exist. Rather,
two large corporate entities, each represented by specialized insurance brokers
or risk managers, negotiated the terms of the insurance contracts. Neither Truck
nor other respondents drafted or controlled the policy language: thus, the rea-
sons for the general rule of construction-"to protect the insured's reasonable
expectation of coverage in a situation in which the insurer-draftsman controls
the language of the policy"-were non-existent. None of the authorities relied
upon by Fibreboard reflects a comparable factual situation where the insured
itself drafted or proposed the policy language. Moreover, to the extent that any
ambiguity exists, ordinarily it would be interpreted against Fibreboard, the
party who caused the uncertainty to exist.
Id. at 468, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 206-07 (citations and footnote omitted.)
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acts of the legislature?"' Although one California court when specifi-
cally confronted with this issue decided that the pro-insured, pro-
coverage rules should be applied,"8 most courts do not, in this con-
text, apply rules of contract interpretation to statutes.86
The inappropriateness of applying rules developed to address
problems encountered with adhesion contracts to statutes seems so
evident that it is difficult to justify the California Supreme Court's
implicit approval in Clemmer of that practice in connection with In-
surance Code section 533.87 Of course, a literal application of section
533 would preempt most, if not all, the California Supreme Court
had accomplished in whittling down contractual exclusions for losses
caused by intentional acts. Any effort to go outside the literal lan-
guage of section 533, which has existed in essentially the same form
since 1872,8 through the traditional methods of negating literal con-
struction of statutes, such as use of legislative history or committee
reports, would be suspect given the absence of source material.
Often, however, the absence of an historical record is ignored by
courts in favor of contemporary notions of jurisprudence and social
policy.
The narrowing down of Insurance Code section 533 must be
seen as essentially a pragmatic decision resting on the court's deci-
sion to advance basic policies underlying insurance law, such as in-
demnification and fulfilling the reasonable expectations of the in-
sured. The California Supreme Court's decisions equating
"willfulness" with "intent to injure" must be based on Insurance
84. Under the "Wildman Doctrine" all applicable statutes become incorporated into the
insurance policy. Wildman v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 307 P.2d 359
(1957).
85. See Weatherford v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 567, 570, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 22, 24 (1966).
86. See Interinsurance Exch. v. Marquez, 116 Cal. App. 3d 652, 656, 172 Cal. Rptr.
263, 264 (1981) ("Conceding that any ambiguity or uncertainty [in] an insurance policy will
be construed against the insurer which caused the ambiguity, where the language is that of the
Legislature, then that rule does not apply.") (citation omitted). Cf Schreiber v. Pennsylvania
Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co., 498 Pa. 21, 444 A.2d 647 (1982) (addressing statutorily pre-
scribed claim presentment period incorporated into insurance contract):
[A] statutory requirement can hardly be termed a "contract of adhesion," im-
posed unfairly by the stronger party upon the weaker. Rather, it represents a
legislative determination of a reasonable period within which suits must be
brought, a careful balancing of the interests of both insurers and insureds. The
validity of this statutorily mandated limitation of suit provision has been consist-
ently upheld.
Id. at 23, 444 A.2d at 649 (citations omitted).
87. CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1972).
88. See Farbstein & Stillman, supra note 55.
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Code section 533, not on the fiction that a statute is subject to con-
tract rules of construction because it is deemed to be a part of every
insurance contract. Unfortunately, the term "willfully" is not defined
in the Insurance Code. Interestingly, where the term is defined in
another Code89 the legislature was careful to note that "willfully"
did not include a specific intent to injure.9 One can extrapolate from
the legislature's actions two mutually exclusive views: (1) the term
"willfully" should be consistently construed as not including a spe-
cific intent to injure; or (2) in the absence of a specific limitation, as
found in Penal Code section 7, the legislature should be presumed to
have intended that the term "willfully" include a specific intent to
injure. Neither construction appears to have a better intrinsic claim
to application than the other; the legislature has failed to point the
way, and the court must adopt one construction over the other since
both cannot be consistently applied.
In the end, the best claim for the adoption of the "specific intent
to injure" requirement is that it is consistent with the general pro-
coverage orientation of California Courts in cases involving insur-
ance coverage questions.9 ' And rather than simply resting on rules of
contract interpretation applied to adhesion contracts, the basis for the
"intent to injure" requirement must rest on the quasi-public nature
of the insurance business that demands greater policing of insured-
insurer relationships to prevent overreaching and abuse and to insure
fulfillment of the basic goal of compensation for losses. It is only
when the loss is deliberately brought about by the insured that the
compensation goal is overridden by the conflicting goals of punish-
ment, deterrence and cost-containment. It is in this limited situation
that the general exclusion found in Insurance Code section 533
should be applied. If the insurer seeks a broader exclusion for inten-
tional, willful acts, it should do so by specific, express language in
the insurance policy.92
89. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1985).
90. See infra note 154 and accompanying text; but see supra note 69.
91. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text. Although this pro-coverage orienta-
tion is of long duration, it has never been specifically approved by the Legislature. Interest-
ingly, where the courts have considered this issue in the context of legislative intent, it has only
been in the relatively limited context of financial responsibility laws. See, e.g., Barrera v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969). Since no
specific statute is implicated by the pro-coverage rule, the principle of legislative acquiescence
to establish construction probably does not apply. See People v. Hallner, 43 Cal. 2d 715, 277
P.2d 393 (1954); Slocum v. Bear Valley Irrigation Co., 122 Cal. 555, 55 P. 403 (1898).
92. Cf Barrera, 71 Cal. 2d at 668, 456 P.2d at 681-82, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 113-14. It
should be noted that in Barrera, the Court relied on the quasi-public nature of the insurance
business to justify the use of pro-coverage rules of construction.
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B. The Insurance Policy's General Contractual Exclusion
The traditional formulation of the policy exclusion for inten-
tional acts as "injury or damage caused intentionally by or at the
direction of the insured" was held in Gray v. Zurich Insurance
Co.," to be ambiguous. Relying on the standard rules used to con-
strue exclusions, the court held that the juxtapositioning of the terms
"intentional" and "at the direction of" would cause the average in-
sured to believe that the exclusion only applies to "collusive, willful
or planned actions beyond the notion of intentional tort." '94
Most policies today seek to limit coverage for intentional acts by
adoption of language from the Insurance Service Office 95 [ISO] Stan-
dard Form which, using "occurrence" as the insured event, defines
"'occurrence" as an accident which occurs during the policy period
resulting in bodily injury or property damage "neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured." Since under the stan-
dard ISO language, the perspective from which "expectedness" or
"intendedness" is viewed is from the standpoint of the insured, the
fact that the resulting consequences were unexpected or unintended
insofar as the victim is concerned is not controlling. This perspective
constrains coverage significantly. Were the perspective that of the
victim, many more acts would be deemed unintentional as few indi-
viduals consciously intend their own injury.
A significant limitation on the policy exclusion for intentional
acts is the requirement that the insured must intentionally cause in-
jury. Thus, in Meyer v. Pacific Employers Insurance Co.,97 the in-
surer was not relieved of its obligation to indemnify its insured for
damages resulting from the insured's trespass. During drilling oper-
ations by the insured on its property, vibrations from the drilling
damaged adjacent property. The insurer was held obligated to pay.
Although the insured's act was "intentional" and even "wrongful"
under trespass law, the insured did not intend to inflict any harm
thereby.98 Thus, simply because the insured commits an intentional
93. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
94. Id. at 273, 419 P.2d at 174, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (footnote omitted).
95. See supra note 34.
96. Where such conduct is anticipated, as in life insurance contexts, it is addressed
through suicide exclusions. In many instances a critical issue is the mental competence of the
victim of the suicide. See infra notes 204-10 and accompanying text. The rigorous scrutiny
courts give suicide clauses illustrates the difficulty an insurer faces in prevailing on the argu-
ment that the victim intended his own injury.
97. 233 Cal. App. 2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1965).
98. Id. at 327, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
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tort does not mean that his conduct falls within the intentional act
exclusion. Where the injury was unforeseen or unintended, and
within the risk assumed by the insurer, the exclusion does not
apply.99
A related issue which has received no attention in California
and little attention nationally, is whether the insured's negligence
which allows the insured's agent to commit an act, which from the
agent's standpoint falls within the intentional act exclusion, operates
to deny the insured coverage for its liability.'0 Where the insured's
liability is strictly vicarious, the decided tendency is to find coverage
for the insured's liability."' The question arises whether the same
should hold true if the insured is somewhat at fault. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has recently suggested that the negligence of the insured, which
allowed the insured's agent to inflict a loss that from the agent's
standpoint is within the exclusion, should not bar coverage for the
insured. In American States Insurance Co. v. Borbor by Borbor,'12
the insureds (husband and wife) were sued for injuries inflicted on
children who attended a nursery school owned and operated by
them. The complaints alleged that the children had been molested by
one of the co-insureds, the husband, while at the school. The insured
wife tendered the defense of the action to her insurer, American
States Insurance Co. American subsequently sought a declaration
that the policy did not afford coverage for the acts complained of in
the actions brought against the insureds. Although the husband in-
sured's conduct'03 was within the exclusion for intentional acts,' 4
the critical issue was whether the exclusion extended to the co-in-
sured wife. The court found that it did not.1
05
The court relied primarily on what it perceived to be the incon-
sistency between the purposes which underlie the exclusion and the
consequences of denying a co-insured coverage due to her negligence.
99. See, e.g., Mullen v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 163, 171, 140 Cal. Rptr.
605, 610 (1977) ("It is possible that an act of the insured may carry out his 'intention' and
also cause unintended harm") (citations omitted).
100. See Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. Thee Kandy Store, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (allegation that insured was negligent in failing to prevent an employee from committing
an assault and battery was insufficient to escape intentional act exclusion in policy).
101. The issues of pure vicarious liability and the exclusion for intentional acts are
discussed at infra notes 222-32 and accompanying text.
102. 826 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying California law).
103. The husband had been convicted of molesting children. Id. at 889.
104. Id.
105. Only the statutory exclusion (CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1972)) was addressed
in Borbor. Id. at 889. The court, however, followed the current practice of conflating the
statutory and contractual exclusions. Id at 893.
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The court identified the purpose of enforcing the exclusion as essen-
tially following the equitable maxim that no wrongdoer should bene-
fit from his wrong.1"6 The court then held without further discussion
that the "innocent" co-insured was entitled to the benefit of insur-
ance but the malevolent molester was not."0 ' The court unfortunately
was not able to bridge the gap between its rationale and its applica-
tion,108 because its rationale was flawed. As noted earlier, the nexus
between the "no benefit" rationale and the intentional act exclusion
is chimerical.'
A flawed premise does not necessarily mean a flawed result.1 0
The critical issue remains whether the exclusion, as drafted, encom-
passes the act or conduct which fixes liability on the co-insured. Al-
though an insurer can draft language that will, by its terms, deny
coverage to a co-insured whose negligence allows another insured to
engage in intentional misconduct to the detriment of others, that situ-
ation was not before the court in Borbor. Borbor's broad statements
indicating that the negligence of the co-insured does not preclude
coverage must be read in light of the court's focus on the statutory
exclusion. Analysis of the question in the context of a contractual
exclusion remains a matter of case by case construction of the policy
language. Indeed, as noted in Borbor, the simple inclusion or omis-
sion of the word "any" may be determinative of the contract issue.1 '
If the insurer uses the standard ISO language noted earlier, it is
difficult to envision how the insurer could satisfactorily contend that
the insured's negligence amounted to intentional or expected conduct
from the standpoint of the insured. The logical and semantical
106. Id. at 893-94.
107. Id. at 894.
108. Id. at 894-95.
109. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
110. Particularly in connection with reliance on Insurance Code section 533, it is diffi-
cult to envision how "negligent" conduct could ever satisfy the "preconceived design" test that
presently is used to apply the statute. If words have meaning, the insured would be required to
affirmatively engage in some conduct evidencing or constituting a "preconceived design." Neg-
ligence is the antithesis of such a standard. Since the court in Borbor found that the wife was a
separate insured (826 F.2d at 893), and since no facts indicated a "preconceived design" on
her part to injure the children, the statutory exclusion did not apply.
111. Borbor, 826 F.2d at 894; cf. Sales v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 849 F.2d
1383, 1385 (11th Cir. 1988) ("By stating that the entire policy is void when any insured
intentionally conceals a material fact or circumstance, the contract clearly makes Mrs. Sales'
recovery contingent upon Mr. Sales' conduct.") (emphasis in original); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Foster, 693 F. Supp. 886, 889 (D. Nev. 1988) (collecting cases). Such clauses have been held
to be valid and not violative of public policy. Amick v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 862
F.2d 704 (8th Cir. 1988). Whether such a provision would be enforced in California is beyond
the scope of this paper. See infra note 231.
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problems with such an approach suggest the likely judicial reaction
to such a contention by an insured. Indeed, no doubt cognizant of the
implausibility of the argument under the standard ISO language, in
most cases insurers approach the problem by using attribution argu-
ments by which the "innocent" insured is deemed to legally share in
the animus possessed by the malevolent insured. These efforts are
generally rejected today." 2
C. The Statutory Exclusion as Distinct From the Policy Exclusion
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. American Em-
ployer's Insurance Co.,"' the court found a distinction between In-
surance Code section 533's exclusion for willful acts and an express
policy exclusion for intentionally caused injury. The court stated that
Insurance Code section 533 focuses on the intention to do the act
which causes the damage rather than on the resulting damage. Thus,
injury different in kind from that intended when the act was com-
mitted would be, under this rationale, not excluded from coverage by
the standard policy exclusion but would be excluded by operations of
section 533. The distinction discussed in United States Fidelity &
Guaranty case was noted but not commented on in Allstate Insur-
ance Co. v. Kim L." 4 Most California decisions, albeit by their si-
lence, do not appear to recognize the distinction found in United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. The consistent approach to resolv-
ing questions whether the intentional act exclusion applies has been
to view the act, the consequences of the act, and the context in which
both arose as determinative as to whether the loss is covered."' This
112. Borbor, 826 F.2d at 892:
We disagree with the court's conclusion that California Insurance Code § 533
bars coverage for Isabel. In reaching this conclusion, the district court appears
to have collapsed two separate considerations into one. The first consideration is
whether a partner may be liable for the wilful acts of a co-partner. The second,
and critical issue here, is whether a partner who is liable for the wilful acts of a
co-partner may be insured against that liability in light of California Insurance
Code § 533. Isabel's liability for James' acts may be distinguished from her
ability to insure against that liability.
(footnote omitted). The issue of the attribution of intent between co-insureds is addressed at
infra notes 221-32 and accompanying text.
113. 159 Cal. App. 3d 277, 205 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1984).
114. 160 Cal. App. 3d 326, 334 n.4, 206 Cal. Rptr. 609, 614 n.4 (1984).
115. See Arenson v. National Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 81, 84, 286 P.2d
816, 818 (1955) (Insurance Code section 533 "has no application to a situation where the
plaintiff is not personally at fault"); Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 887, 587
P.2d 1098, 1110, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285, 297 (1978) (insured's mental state is a factor in deter-
mining whether insured possessed "intent to injury"); Walters v. American Ins. Co., 185 Cal.
App. 2d 776, 8 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1960) (injuries intentionally inflicted on another while acting
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tendency to conflate analysis under either the statutory or contract
exclusions is abetted by the California Supreme Court's construction
of a contractual exclusion for intentional acts as requiring a "precon-
ceived design," '116 a test that was subsequently incorporated into the
statutory exclusion.' 7
Notwithstanding this general tendency to conflate analysis of
the statutory and contractual intentional act exclusion, one federal
district court has recently picked up the distinction noted between
intent and act. In American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.
v. Vista Medical Supply,"" the court stated in dicta:
A number of Court of Appeals cases have been decided since
Clemmer, construing policy exclusions of coverage for non-acci-
dental acts, and they focus not on the intent of the insured to
cause harm, but upon the nature of the harmful act it-
self-whether it was an accident . . . . [U]nder California law
an insurer may place more restrictive limits on its liability for
intentional acts than that limit provided by section 533"9
The court is correct that there is language in California cases
giving more significance to the nature of the act that occasioned the
loss than the intent of the actor who committed the act. The diffi-
culty is that if we are focusing on an intentional act exclusion, the
only thing that can matter is intent.12 It is simply wordsmanship on
the part of the court to suggest that an intentional act exclusion can
be established merely by the act. The fact that previous courts have
committed the error, does not justify continued perpetration of the
mistake. It may, of course, be the case that losses resulting from cer-
tain types of acts may be excluded from coverage. Thus, a policy
might exclude coverage for losses resulting from the act of operating
a motor vehicle or practicing a profession or having sexual relations
with a minor. Those exclusions would focus on the act that gave rise-
to the loss, and properly so. It is improper, however, to attempt to
accomplish the same end by use of an intentional act exclusion and
exclude all reference to intent.
in self defense are not "willful" acts for purposes of Insurance Code section 533); Meyer v.
Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1965) (unforeseen
consequences of intentional acts do not constitute "willful" acts for purposes of Insurance Code
section 533).
116. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 273, 419 P.2d 168, 174, 54 Cal. Rptr.
104, 110 (1966).
117. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
118. 699 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
119. Id. at 790 (citations omitted).
120. See supra notes 3-5, 43-50 and accompanying text.
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The statutory and policy exclusions for intentional acts do differ
generally, 121 however, in two ways. First, the statutory exclusion
only declares, as against public policy, indemnification for loss will-
fully caused; it does not, by its terms, preclude other forms of cover-
age, such as the right of the insurer to contract to provide a legal
defense to civil and/or criminal charges for losses which could not be
indemnified because of the statutory' exclusion.1 22 A contractual ex-
clusion, if enforced, results in the insurance becoming simply irrele-
vant because by its terms coverage does not exist and no obligations
on the part of the insurer arise. Of course, if the statutory exclusion
is treated as an implied term of the insurance contract, 2 ' the court
may, albeit incorrectly, extend the statutory exclusion beyond its
stated objectives.124
Second, the statutory and policy formulations of the intentional
act exclusion do differ in that the standard ISO language uses the
terminology "expected or intended." The question is whether the
terms "expected" and "intended" in the standard policy provision
addressing coverage exclusion for intentional acts are synonymous.
There is a dearth of authorities on this issue and what authorities
exist are split. Several courts have held that the distinction between
121. Since the policy exclusion can be modified at the parties' discretion, the parties' can
create specific differences through drafting of specialized terms. On the other hand, since the
statutory exclusion embodies public policies that are deemed to transcend the interests of the
individual parties to the contract, attempts to modify the statutory exclusion by contract are not
allowed. But cf. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Wilks, 206 Cal. App. 3d 251, 258, 253 Cal. Rptr. 596,
600 (1988) (insurer waived contract exclusion for losses due to libel or slander resulting from
willful misconduct or malice on the part of its insured to avoid a conflict of interest and having
to pay for independent (Cutnis) counsel for its insured; the court did not raise or discuss the
issue of Insurance Code section 533, even though the effect of the waiver was to commit the
insurer to indemnify the insured for a loss willfully brought about).
122. See Jaffe v. Cranford Ins. Co., 168 Cal. App. 3d 930, 935 n.9, 214 Cal. Rptr. 567,
571 n.9 (1985). But see CAL. INS. CODE § 533.5 (West 1989 Supp.), discussed at infra note
276.
123. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
124. See Maxon v. Security Ins. Co., 214 Cal. App. 2d 603, 615-17, 29 Cal. Rptr. 586,
593-94 (1963) (no coverage of defense costs where conduct of insured fell within the statutory
exclusion for willful acts which is incorporated into every insurance contract). It is significant,
however, that Maxon was decided prior to the California Supreme Court's expansion of the
duty to defend in Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966). At the time Maxon was decided, the accepted rule in California was that the existence
of a duty to defend depended on whether the complaint stated a claim within coverage. See
also Remmer v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 84, 295 P.2d 19 (1956). Hence, if
the complaint stated a claim outside coverage (as was the case in Maxon), a court could uphold
the insurer's refusal to accept the defense of the action. This approach was largely rejected by
Gray. See Note, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Made Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 UCLA L.
REV. 1328 (1967).
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"intended" and "expected" is unclear."2 6 Other jurisdictions which
have considered the term "expected" have given the term construc-
tions which run from "reasonably anticipated" to "substantially
probable. ' 126 Several courts have treated the terms "intended" and
"expected" as synonymous. 12
Jurisdictions which have identified a distinction have reasoned:
"[These two words "intended" and "expected" cannot be treated as
synonymous . . . .Even where the damages, are not accomplished
by design or plan (not intended), they may be of such a nature that
they should have been reasonably anticipated (expected) by the in-
sured."' 28 There is clearly linguistic merit to the view that when two
terms are used in the disjunctive, they cannot be considered to be
synonymous or complimentary. If this view were accepted here, Cal-
ifornia would recognize a significant distinction between the statu-
tory and the contract exclusion for intentional acts and would give
the contract exclusion a broader application than afforded by the
statutory exclusion. Other jurisdictions have felt that such a distinc-
tion might operate to exclude not only intentional acts but those
caused by negligence.' 29 It is the view of these courts that such a
result would run counter to the insured's reasonable expectation, for
few insured's would understand that the very purpose for which in-
surance was procured, protection from negligent acts, would be viti-
ated due to the "serious legal consequences emanat[ing] from the
word 'expected.' ""80 To avoid that problem, the term "expected" is
125. Poston v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 107 Wis. 2d 215, 320 N.W.2d 9
(1982); Pique v. Saia, 450 So. 2d 654 (La. 1984).
126. See Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of Liability Insurance
Policy (Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended) Expected By Insured, 31 A.L.R. 4th 957, 999-
1002 (1984) (collecting cases).
127. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Muth, 190 Neb. 248, 250, 207
N.W.2d 364, 366 (1973) (injury is either expected or intended only if the insured acted with
the specific intent to cause harm to a third party).
128. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Freyer, 89 Ill. App. 3d 617, 620, 411 N.E.2d 1157,
1159 (1980). See also Bay State Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 96 11. 2d 487, 494, 451 N.E.2d 880, 882-
83 (1983) (injuries which should have been reasonably anticipated by the insured are "ex-
pected" within the meaning of insurance policy).
129. Grange Mut. Casualty Co. v. Thomas, 301 So. 2d 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
provides:
If we were to give the exclusion before us the meaning argued by appellant,
then, by a parity of reasoning, we would have to exclude an injury from an
unintentional tort which a given jury might categorize as being "expected" de-
pending upon the degree of likelihood thereof under the facts and circumstances
of the case. Conceivably, indeed, this might include an injury resulting from
simple negligence . . ..
Id. at 159.
130. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Elitzky, 358 Pa. Super. 362, 379, 517 A.2d 982, 991
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held to require an element of conscious awareness' that for all in-
tents and purposes renders it synonymous with the term
"intended."' 82
Which approach California courts will take to this problem is
open. It is clear that the insurance industry did not intend the terms
"expected" and "intended" to be viewed as interchangeable. 33 It is
just as clear, however, that jurisdictions have disagreed over what the
two terms mean and this itself is often a prelude to a finding that the
language used in the policy is ambiguous,' 34 and thus to be given a
pro-coverage construction, if possible. This approach tends to con-
flate the two terms, resulting in the treatment of "expected" as sy-
nonymous with "intended."' 85
The proper resolution of the question is difficult. It is clear that
the term "expected" was not inserted into the insurance contract to
provide insurers with an escape hatch in cases of losses caused by the
insured's negligence. The term "expected" intuitively and grammati-
cally suggests a level of awareness of the probable consequences of
one's conduct which, while not rising to the level of premeditation or
(1986), appeal denied, 528 A.2d 957 (1987).
131. Id. at 380, 517 A.2d at 991:
We hold that for purposes of an exclusionary clause in an insurance contract,
expected injury means that the insured acted even though he was substantially
certain that an injury generally similar to the harm which occurred would re-
sult. This interpretation affords insured persons the maximum legal protection
they could reasonably expect under a contract excluding expected injuries.
132. Id.
133. See R. KEETON & A. WIDSS, supra note 1, § 5.4(e)(4), at 538 (adoption of the
term "expected" was designed to address problem of "recurrence" and "highly expectable
losses" that were in the nature of inherent costs associated with the manufacturing of a
product).
134. The fact that different courts have given similar language in the insurance contract
disparate interpretations, has been relied on to support a finding of ambiguity. Annotation,
Division of Opinion Among Judges As Evidence That Particular Clause of Insurance Policy
is Ambiguous, 4 A.L.R. 4th 1253 (1981) (no reported California decisions in the annotation).
Under this rationale, language is deemed to be clear until one court finds otherwise; when this
occurs, all courts should find the language that was heretofore clear to now be unclear. Taken
to its logical extreme, the fact that the parties are contesting the meaning of the contract lan-
guage could be seen as evidence of "ambiguity." California courts have rejected this extension.
See Delgado v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 262, 271, 203 Cal. Rptr. 672, 677
(1984); but see Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Globe Indem. Co., 303 Minn. 16, 225 N.W.2d 831,
837 (1975). ("The very fact that [the parties'] respective positions as to what the policy says
are contrary compels one to conclude that the agreement is indeed ambiguous").
135. See United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Elitzky, 358 Pa. Super. 362, 372, 517 A.2d 982,
991 (1986), appeal denied, 528 A.2d 957 (1987). As noted previously, the definition given to
the insurance term "accident" by the California Supreme Court suggests that the terms "ex-
pected" and "intended" would be treated as synonymous. See supra notes 47-48 and accompa-
nying text.
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design, is much higher than mere foreseeability.1" The critical issue
thus becomes what level of awareness by the insured that his or her
conduct will result in injury or loss will be required of the insured
before the injury or loss will be deemed "expected" on the part of
the insured. This issue is addressed infra in connection with losses
resulting from "high risk" activities where the insured has no actual
intent to injure, although injury of some sort may be reasonably an-
ticipated as following from the insured's conduct.1 17
IV. STATE OF MIND AND THE INTENTIONAL ACT EXCLUSION
A. Measuring Intent
In order to come within the intentional act exclusion, the in-
sured must have the requisite intent. Surprisingly the appropriate
standard to measure the insured's "intent" has received little atten-
tion by California courts.
Jurisdictions which have considered the issue have recognized at
least three separate tests. Many jurisdictions have adopted a policy-
based approach whereby the insured's intent is "inferred" from the
nature and type of conduct that led to the loss. This approach is very
common in sexual misconduct cases involving adults and minors. 80
In such cases courts infer the requisite intent to harm based on the
legislature's decision to treat the underlying conduct (sexual acts by
adult with child) as subject to criminal sanction. 39
Another approach adopted by several jurisdictions is a subjec-
136. Legal definitions and usages of the concept of "foreseeability" are consistently held
to be inapplicable to the question addressed here. See generally KEETON & WIDSS, SUpra
note 1, § 5.4(e)(4); cf Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 887, 587 P.2d 1098,
1110, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285, 297 (1978) (act that is "intentional" within traditional tort princi-
ples, is not necessarily "intentional" for insurance law purposes); Meyer v. Pacific Employers
Ins. Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 321, 327, 43 Cal. Rptr. 542, 547 (1965). On the other hand,
Illinois courts have recognized that "[ilnjury is 'expected' where the. damages are not accom-
plished by design or plan, i.e., not 'intended,' but are 'of such a nature that they should have
been reasonably anticipated (expected) by the insured.' " Calvert Ins. Co. v. Western Ins. Co.
874 F.2d 396, 399 (7th Cir. 1989), citing Shelter Ins. Cos. v. Smith, 133 Ill. App. 3d 635, 479
N.E.2d 365 (1985) (hard blow to face constitutes an expected injury with respect to insurance
clause in question).
137. See in!fra notes 168-88 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Linebaugh v. Berdish, 144 Mich. App. 750, 376 N.W.2d 400 (1985);
Estate of Lehman v. Metzger, 355 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 1984). Both discussions involve con-
tract exclusions.
139. See infra notes 147-65 and accompanying text; see generally Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Foster, 693 F. Supp. 886, 888 (D. Nev. 1988) ("decisions of other jurisdictions support the
conclusion that intent to harm many be inferred from sexual contact with a minor as a matter
of law, regardless of the insured's subjective intent").
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tive standard. Under this approach, the exclusion only applies when
the insured committed the act resulting in a loss with the specific,
actual intent to bring about that loss.' 4" A few courts blend the sub-
jective and policy-based approaches depending on the nature of the
misconduct. Serious, reprehensible conduct, such as sexual abuse ac-
companied with violence or penetration, is reviewed against the per
se standard for determining whether the insured possessed the requi-
site intent to injure; less reprehensible conduct, i.e., fondling as sex-
ual abuse, is reviewed against a subjective intent standard.""
Finally, a number of jurisdictions have adopted an objective
standard for assessing whether the insured possessed the requisite
intent. This objective standard relies on the act-result distinction
noted earlier." 2 The insured is presumed to intend the natural and
probable consequences of his activity."1 Thus, the objective standard
would apply to the determination of whether the insured intended to
do the act from which the injury or loss resulted; whereas the subjec-
tive standard would focus on whether the insured had the conscious
objective to bring about the injury or loss in fact resulting from his
conduct."' In California, this form of the objective test has been re-
pudiated."" Even when applied, however, there is little to distin-
guish it from the policy-based approach. Even under the objective
standard, the consequence of the insured's conduct must be deemed
harmful or injurious in some way that distinguishes the process so
that all purposive human conduct is not deemed to fall within the
exclusion. In effect the objective test reasons backwards. The nature
of the injury or loss is allowed to dictate the determination of the
insured's "intent" when committing the act that led to the loss. Such
post hoc-propter hoc reasoning is fallacious. The true basis of the
objective test must be seen as being policy based.
B. Measuring Intent in California
Since we are dealing with "intent", it is perhaps appropriate to
label the California approach to the issue of the requisite intent to
140. The leading case expousing the subjective standard in sexual abuse cases is MacK-
innon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 471 A.2d 1166 (N.H. 1984).
141. See Zordan v. Page, 500 So. 2d 608 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
142. See Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 703, 706, 278 N.W.2d 898, 901
(1979). See supra notes 47-51, 65-68 and accompanying text.
143. See CNA Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 282 Ark. 90, 666 S.W.2d 689 (1984).
144. See State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Muth, 190 Neb. 248, 207 N.W.2d 364 (1973);
Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888 (Me. 1981).
145. See supra notes 47-51, 65-68, 93-99 and accompanying text.
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invoke the intentional act exclusion as schizophrenic. This is high-
lighted by the fact that the decisions purport to apply the same statu-
tory exclusion, Insurance Code section 533, yet reach conflicting re-
sults in terms of the actual standard used to measure intent.
The case for the use of a subjective standard follows from the
recent decisions of the California Supreme Court which have grafted
the "preconceived design to injure" language onto the "willfulness"
term on the statutory exclusion. 4 It is difficult to comprehend how
one can have the requisite "preconceived design" unless one has the
actual, conscious objective of bringing about the injury in fact.
Recent California decisions that have considered the issue have
nonetheless adopted a policy-based approach. 4" The foremost case is
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Kim W.' 48 In Kim W. the insured was
sued by Kim W., a minor, for sexual assault. The insurer, Allstate,
brought a declaratory relief action seeking a declaration that the in-
surance policy provided no coverage to the insured for his sexual
assaults on Kim W.'49 The key to the case for the court was the fact
that the sexual assault perpetrated on Kim W. was deemed to be a
violation of California Penal Code section 288.50 The court held
146. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
147. These cases have all involved sexual misconduct/sexual molestation by adults on
minors. Societal attitudes toward sex, particular sex between adults and minors may be a
significant non-legal factor on the adoption of a policy-based approach. Contrast the sex-with-
minors decisions that follow with State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Irene S. (Anonymous),
138 A.D.2d 589, 526 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1988). In Irene S., the plaintiff in the underlying action
alleged that the insured raped her with the intent of transmitting genital herpes. The court
held that coverage was nonetheless available if the damage sustained by the plaintiff (infection
with genital herpes) was unintended.
148. 160 Cal. App. 3d 330, 206 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1984).
149. The insured had been criminally charged with sexual assault (CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 288 (West 1988)) on several children, including Kim W. He had pleaded guilty to a count of
the criminal complaint involving another child and the remaining counts, including the count
involving Kim W., had been dismissed. The insured had also admitted in his Answer to All-
state's Complaint for Declaratory Relief that he "participated in such acts which constituted a
violation of Penal Code No. 288." The court purported to give no weight to either fact, relying
instead on the nature of the claim made by Kim W. against the insured in the civil action. Kim
W., 160 Cal. App. 3d at 333, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12. The admission only operated to
preclude the insured from contesting that he had committed a sexual assault; the court inde-
pendently determined that coverage for the sexual assault was barred by Insurance Code sec-
tion 533.
150. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (West 1988) provides:
(a) Any person who shall willfully and lewdly commit any lewd or lascivious
act including any of the acts constituting other crimes provided for in Part 1 of
this code upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child
under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratify-
ing the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person or of such child, shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term of three,
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that, because of the legislative policy of protecting children underly-
ing Penal Code section 288,151 a violation of section 288 was neces-
sarily injurious to children. Without further analysis, the court held
that a violation of section 288 was a "willful" act within the mean-
ing of Insurance Code section 533.1"2 The court's analysis did not
explain how an "injury to a minor" necessarily evidenced "intent to
injure" on the part of the adult.
The court's opinion may reflect the assumption that since one
intends the natural and probable consequences of one's acts and since
injury to minors is a necessary consequence of violating Penal Code
section 288, the link between intent and consequence was evident.
This approach, while customary in cases of fastening civil liability in
tort, has been repudiated in California. Alternatively, the court may
have been influenced by the requirement of section 288 that there be
proof of specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust or
passions or sexual desires of the perpetrator or the child. 153 Since the
consequences of the insured's conduct were deemed to be necessarily
injurious to the child (Kim W.), the court could have assumed that
the "necessary" consequences must have been contemplated by one
who had the requisite specific intent required by section 288. The
weakness of this linking of the specific intent requirement of section
288 with the necessary injuries suffered by the child is that the spe-
cific intent requirement of section 288 is not focused solely on
arousal of the child. A violation of section 288 can occur where the
intent is to arouse the perpetrator of the sexual assault. Conse-
quently a nexus between the specific intent requirement of section
288 and the consequences of a violation of section 288 injury to a
child does not necessarily exist.
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Kim W. is remarkable in that not-
withstanding the fact that section 288 is not an offense which re-
quires specific intent to injure, 5 the court effectively created such
six or eight years.
151. Kim W., 160 Cal. App. 3d at 332-33, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
152. Id. at 333, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
153. Id. at 332, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
154. While section 288 does use the term "willfully", the Penal Code elsewhere states
that such usage does not envision the incorporation of a specific intent to bring about certain
consequences. See CAL. PENAL CODE §7:
The word "willfully," when applied to the intent with which an act is done or
omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act, or make the
omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure
another, or to acquire any advantage.
See also supra note 69 and accompanying text and supra note 90.
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an intent out of whole cloth. Unfortunately the loose analysis of the
intent issue' 55 has not prevented Kim W. from having significant in-
fluence in subsequent cases.involving the intentional act exclusion.'
Kim W.'s influence has not been without cost. That decision has
tended to overshadow the better reasoned decision in Allstate Insur-
ance Co. v. Overton 5' which involved a misdemeanor battery charge
to which the insured had pleaded guilty. The insured was named in
a civil action arising out of the battery. The insurer sought a decla-
ration of non-coverage. The court refused the insurer's request and
held that since the conviction required only a general intent to do the
act that constituted the offense and the insured testified he intended
no injury, the statutory exclusion for intentional acts did not, as a
matter of law, apply.1 58 It should be noted that insofar as intent to
injure is concerned the offense involved in Overton (Penal Code sec-
tion 242 (battery)) did not differ from the offense involved in Kim
W. (Penal Code section 288 (sexual assault)). Neither required "in-
tent to injure" as an element of the offense.
155. The court asserted that the "preconceived design to injure" standard did not apply
because that test had been articulated in cases where the mental capacity of the insured was at
issue. Kim W., 160 Cal. App. 3d at 333-34, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 612, citing Clemmer v. Hartford
Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1978) which is discussed at
supra notes 67-68 and Congregation of Rodef Sholom v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 91 Cal.
App. 3d 690, 154 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1979) which is discussed at infra notes 192-202. Although
the insured's mental capacity was at issue in each case, neither decision suggests that the
court's use of the "preconceived design" test was necessarily tied or limited to the issue of
mental capacity. And while the court in Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 642 P.2d
1305, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1982) did not specifically adopt the "preconceived design" language,
the court did emphasize the "intent to injure" requirement. Id. at 159, 642 P.2d at 1311, 181
Cal. Rptr. at 790. The linkage between Clemmer and Peterson has been noted by several
California courts. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Overton, 160 Cal. App. 3d 843, 849, 206 Cal. Rptr.
823, 827 (1984). Indeed, a number of courts which specifically recognize that the "precon-
ceived design to injure" test is the basic focus of whether Insurance Code section 533 applies,
nonetheless still apply Kim W. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 852 F.2d 449 (9th Cir.
1988). These courts justify the denial of coverage by finding that certain offenses create an
irrebuttable presumption of intent to injure. Id. at 951 ("this intent can be inferred as a matter
of law by the nature of some acts, such as sexual assault").
156. See, e.g., Gilbert, 852 F.2d at 451-52; State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v.
Bromke, 849 F.2d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir. 1988).
157. 160 Cal. App. 3d 843, 206 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1984).
158. Id. at 849-50, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 827-28. If it were established in the civil action
that the insured did in fact intend to inflict the injury on the victim, the right of indemnifica-
tion would be lost. Many of these cases involve a preliminary determination whether the in-
surer has the duty to defend the insured against the allegations made by the plaintiff. "Duty to
defend" questions raise in themselves significant and substantial legal issues. It is not necessary
to address those issues here except to note that both indemnification and the duty to defend
have a common genesis in the issue whether the loss is covered. Hence, if a court finds that an
insurer has a duty to defend, that determination constitutes a finding that the loss is potentially
subject to indemnification under the insurance contract.
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The motivating force underlying Kim W. and the decisions ap-
plying it is the policy determination that certain acts are inherently
injurious by their very nature."' The danger in this approach is that
it tends to be ad hoc and reflective of the judge's personal attitudes
toward the acts of the insured. For example, in State Farm Fire &
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Abraio60 the relevant acts consisted of
fondling of the genitals of an eight year old child. There was no
indication in the opinion that the act was accompanied by any force
or violence or penetration or threat of any of the above. 6' The court
appeared to be singularly impressed with the age differential be-
tween the participants to the sexual acts.' 62 This, of course, identifies
the difficulty with all ad hoc approaches. The test looks fine in the
cases in which it is first articulated. Those cases typically involve acts
of great reprehensibleness.' 68 The rule, however, tends to find later
application in cases that do not so nicely evidence a necessary intent
to injure. The conduct of the adult in Abraio is offensive but that
does not mean that it was necessarily undertaken with the intent to
injure the minor. The converse of the above problem, the expansive
definition of coverage, also needs to be based on principle not ad hoc
determinations of sympathy for the victim. For example, in State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Irene S. (Anonymous),' the court
held that there was the potential of coverage for the unintended con-
sequence of transmission of genital herpes incident to the rape of the
plaintiff by the insured. 65 The critical fact is that the infectious dis-
ease damage was unintended. It would not be proper to read Irene
S. as holding that all damages incident to a rape are covered. Of
159. See Gilbert, 852 F.2d at 451; Bromke, 849 F.2d at 1219 (intent to harm can be
inferred as a matter of law by the nature of some acts, such as sexual assault, citing Kim W.,
160 Cal. App. 3d at 332, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 613); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Huie,
666 F. Supp. 1402, 1405 (N.D. Cal. 1987) provides: "Regardless of the language of individual
criminal statutes, or the language used by the California courts in the individual cases before
them, the legislative intent is clear. That is, that some acts are so extreme that public policy
does not permit them to be insured." The source of the "legislative intent" was not disclosed in
the opinion.
160. 683 F. Supp. 220 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff d on other grounds, 874 F.2d 619 (9th
Cir. 1989).
161. Id. at 222.
162. The court found that "the conclusion [is] inescapable that the initiation of sexual
activity by a sixty-three year old man with an eight year old child is inherently harmful." Id.
163. Thus, in Kim W., 160 Cal. App. 3d at 333 n.3, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 613 n.3, the
insured had apparently engaged in the sexual abuse of several children; in Bromke, 849 F.2d
at 1219, the insured had aided and abetted the kidnapping, rape and forced oral copulation of
a 14 year old girl.
164. 138 A.D.2d 589, 526 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1988).
165. Id. at 591, 526 N.Y.2d 173.
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course, this proper approach raises potentially difficult issues of ap-
portionment and divisibility.
If the difficulties are perceived to be great, then the issue can
always be addressed by clear and conspicuous policy language or by
legislative fiat where the political costs and considerations can be
properly brought to bear on the problem. A per se test is simply
inconsistent with the "preconceived design to injure" standard cur-
rently used to define the term "willfully" in Insurance Code section
533. The issue of intent to injure remains one of fact to be estab-
lished in each case; it should not be preempted by judicial ad hoc
policy pronouncements that are inconsistent with the basic standard.
Abolishing artificial ad hoc approaches does not open the flood
gates insofar as insurer exposure for its insured's intentional miscon-
duct is concerned. While the requisite "intent to injure" will invaria-
bly have to be inferred from the circumstances of the act, in some
instances the inference will be so strong as to support a motion for
summary judgment. 6
In any event, if the potential exposure of insurers is increased
by use of an actual intent to injure test, the proper approach to
resolving claims of insurer prejudice would be to give such a ruling
only prospective application if insurers could show that they relied to
their prejudice on a clearly established "per se" rule.'67
C. Intent to Cause Injury Versus Intent to Cause Specific Injury
The "intent to injure" issue also involves the question whether
166. In some cases the failure of the insured or the victim to rebut the insurer's evidence
of the requisite "intent to injure" has influenced the court to sustain the insurer's position. See
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Abraio, 874 F.2d 619, 623 (9th Cir. 1989); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Gilbert, 852 F.2d 449, 452-53 (9th Cir. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Overton, 160 Cal.
App. 3d 843, 850-51, 206 Cal. Rptr. 823, 828-29 (1984). California decisions have split on
this issue, although a clear majority appear to treat the issue of intent to injure as irrebuttable
in sexual abuse cases. Compare Fire Ins. Exch. v. Abbott, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 620 (1988) (presumption irrebutable) with J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M. K., 209
Cal. App. 3d 1208, 257 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1989) (no general presumption should be adopted that
person who commits sexual abuse intends to cause injury to victim), rev. granted by Cal. Sup.
Ct. (S010524), 777 P.2d 83, 261 Cal. Rptr. 310 (July 26, 1989).
167. Although judicial decisions are normally retroactive in application, it is recognized
that retroactive application may be denied where substantial prejudice would arise. Despite the
presumption that new rules apply retroactively, California recognizes that the presumption
will not be applied where to do so would be fundamentally unfair and contravene public
policy. See generally 9 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, APPEAL §§ 812-815 (1985)
(collecting cases). Since the per se rule has only been applied in sexual assault cases and has
not found application in other "intentional" act contexts, insurers might have difficulty demon-
strating that they have relied on such a rule in setting premiums such that retroactive change
of the per se rule would cause them prejudice in a way that is fundamentally unfair.
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the insured must have intended the specific injury that in fact oc-
curred or whether it is sufficient if the insured possessed a general
intent in that he only intended some injury. The general intent to
injure requirement may be summarized as requiring: (1) that the
insured intended both the act as well as the infliction of an injury;
and (2) that once it is found that some harm was intended, it is
immaterial that the actual harm caused is of a different character or
magnitude than that intended.'
0 8
The distinction becomes important in cases involving "high
risk" activities or injuries inflicted as a consequence of practical jokes
or horseplay. The cases are split whether in such circumstances the
insured's "intent" voids coverage for resulting injuries.' 69
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. American Em-
ployers Insurance Co.,17 the insured intentionally ignited a fire in
trash behind a building. The fire spread, engulfing the building, a
shed, as well as an adjoining structure. The insured disclaimed any
168. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 159 Cal.
App. 3d 277, 205 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1984); see generally Clark v. Allstate Ins. Co., 22 Ariz.
App. 601, 529 P.2d 1195 (1975); Butler v. Behaeghe, 37 Colo. App. 282, 548 P.2d 934
(1976).
169. Pro-insured cases include Morrill v. Gallagher, 370 Mich. 578, 122 N.W.2d 687
(1963). In Morrill, the defendant, Gallagher, threw a cherry bomb into the plaintiff's office,
attempting merely to scare. Instead, the plaintiff sustained a serious hearing impairment. The
insurer, in its defense of the case, relied in part upon the intentional tort exclusion. The court
rejected the defense position and stated: "There is nothing in this case to justify [the] conclu-
sion that [the insured] intended to cause any physical harm to the plaintiff." Id. at 581, 122
N.W.2d at 691. Similarly, in Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer, 663 P.2d 338 (Mont. 1983),
the insured was a safety officer at a smelter. The employees of the smelter regularly tested
breathing apparatuses for leaks by having harmful smoke blown in their faces while wearing
the apparatus. The insured, as a practical joke, removed the filter from the apparatus of an
unsuspecting employee and squirted him with smoke. The insured thought the employee
would suffer only minor discomfort; in fact, he received significant injuries. The court held
that the insured did not possess the requisite intent to injure. On the other hand, in Pachucki
v. Republic Ins. Co., 89'Wis. 2d 703, 278 N.W.2d 898 (1979), the insured was engaged in a
"greening pin war" with fellow employees which is the flinging of paper clips with a rubber
band. One of the combatants became a war casualty when he was struck in the eye with a
projectile flung by the insured. Although the insured disclaimed any intent to injure, the court
found that his admitted intent to strike the person of another with a rubber band propelled
paper clip was sufficient:
The trial court's finding that the intent to inflict injury could be inferred from
the nature of the defendant's intentional acts is not contrary to the great weight
and clear preponderance of the evidence in the record. There was testimony
supporting the fact that each of the defendants had prior knowledge that being
struck with a greening pin will result in injury. Boeschke stated on one occasion
after being hit by a greening pin he suffered an injury and bled.
Id. at 708, 278 N.W.2d at 903.
170. 159 Cal. App. 3d 277, 205 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1984).
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intent to cause the subsequent conflagration."' Although the court
did give some weight to the strong evidence indicating that the in-
sured had the specific intent to destroy the buildings by fire,"7 2 the
court adopted an approach which did not require it to weigh the
facts regarding the actual intent possessed by the insured:
Smith [the insured] knew what he was doing was wrong. He
intended to start a fire and he knew that damage was likely to
result. Smith ignited several other damaging fires that same day.
Smith pleaded guilty to arson, a crime in which one "willfully
and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned...
any structure . . . or property." (CAL. PEN. CODE section 451.)
Clearly, Michael Smith's act in causing the fire was well be-
yond the sort of intentional misconduct involved in ordinary
negligence and was willful within the meaning of Insurance
Code Section 533173
Under this approach it was sufficient if the insured intended some
injury. It is not necessary that the insured intend to cause the very
injury actually sustained.' 74
The issue was considered by the California Supreme Court in
Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co.' 7 5 Clemmer involved an in-
sured who had shot and killed his partner. The insured was con-
victed of second degree murder after he withdrew his plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity. The victim's widow obtained a judg-
171. The insured testified that he was "surprised and scared when he saw that the roof
of the shed was on fire, and he called the fire department so that the building would not burn
down." Id. at 281-82, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
172. The court noted that the insured set several fires in addition to the one at issue and
that after he phoned the fire department regarding the fire at issue, he then proceeded to set
another fire. Id. at 281, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 463. Later in the opinion the court noted that the
way in which the insured began the fire "indicatfed] an intent to do more than merely start a
trash fire." Id. at 287, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
173. Id. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim W., 160 Cal. App. 3d 326, 206 Cal. Rptr. 609(1984), the court applied the same approach to the standard policy exclusion for intentional
acts, although it did so in connection with whether a per se rule should be recognized for
sexual misconduct losses. In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bromke, 849 F.2d 1218, 1219(9th Cir. 1988), Kim W. was applied in a statutory exclusion (Insurance Code section 533)
case.
174. The court also stated, "[the insured] clearly acted with the wrongful intent to cause
damage to the property against which he set the fire. It is immaterial that he subjectively did
not expect or intend to cause the extent of damage which actually occurred." United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 159 Cal. App. 3d at 291, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 469 (footnote omitted).
Under this reasoning if an insured struck another in anger but because the other person's jaw
was open when the blow was received grievous injury was sustained, the loss would not be
covered even though the injury was neither intended nor foreseen! But see Breland v. Schil-
ling, 550 So.2d 609 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1989) (injury under such circumstances was not intended).
175. 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1978).
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ment against the insured which she sought to enforce against the
insurer, Hartford. One of the objections raised by Hartford related
to the instructions given the jury on the issue of willfulness." 6 Hart-
ford complained that the instruction given the jury had failed to de-
fine "willfulness" and that the trial judge had improperly allowed
the jury to consider the insured's mental competency to form the req-
uisite intent to injure. 177 Hartford argued that the instruction actu-
ally given the jury "had the effect of requiring the jury to find the
existence of what amounted to a specific intent to kill in order to find
willfulness.' ' 78 Hartford contended that a specific intent to kill was
not required but only the general intent to do an act more blame-
worthy than misconduct involved in ordinary negligence.' 79 In effect,
Hartford wanted the issue of "willfulness" to turn on the gravity of
the act resulting in the loss rather than on the actual state of mind of
the person (insured) committing the act that resulted in the loss. The
court rejected Hartford's arguments on this point:
It is clear, however, that [Hartford's] argument not only ignores
the specific language of the instruction-which speaks in terms
of intent to "shoot and harm," not in terms of intent to
kill-but refuses to recognize the clear line of authority in this
state to the effect that even an act which is "intentional" or
"willful" within the meaning of traditional tort principles will
not exonerate the insurer from liability under Insurance Code
section 533 unless it is done with a "preconceived design to in-
flict injury." The instruction given by the trial court simply ap-
plied this principle to a situation in which the actor's capacity to
harbor the requisite "design" was placed in issue through evi-
dence bearing upon his mental state. There was no error in this
respect.180
176. Id. at 886-87, 587 P.2d at 1110, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
177. Brief for Appellant, at 47-48, Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587
P.2d 1098, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1978).
178. Clemnmner, 22 Cal. 3d at 886-87, 587 P.2d at 1110, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
179. Brief for Appellant, at 48-49. Appellant's instruction would aid an insurer in that
the offered instruction focused on the insured's act rather than the insured's intent in commit-
ting the act. The offered instructions provided in part:
An act is a "willful act" within the meaning of the question you are to decide,
and within the meaning of my instructions, if the act is more blameworthy than
the sort of misconduct involved in ordinary negligence, that is, if the act was
performed with an improper motive or purpose . . ..
Clemnner, 22 Cal. 3d at 887 n.13, 587 P.2d at 1110 n.13, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 297 n.13. The
offered instructions also included a definition of "willful act": "[A] person willfully harms
another when he knows and understands what he is doing and has the purpose of intending to
harm him." Id.
180. Id. at 887, 587 P.2d at 1110, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
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The court's rejection of the "gravity of the offense argument under-
mines the approach undertaken in the sexual misconduct conduct
cases which presume intent to injure from the nature of the act.
Reading Clemmer and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
together, a two pronged rule could be extracted which holds: first,
that as long as the insured possessed the intent to inflict some injury,
the intentional act exclusion applies; second, the insured's mental ca-
pacity is relevant to determining whether the insured possessed the
requisite "intent to injure." It is nonetheless doubtful that this two-
pronged rule is sound or can be consistently applied to achieve fair
results. The problem lies with the implicit recognition in Clemmer
and explicit recognition in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
-that the insured's intent to inflict "some injury" justifies denial of
coverage even as to actual, unforeseen injuries.
One inconsistency of the above approach is the suggestion that
while the insured need not intend the specific injury sustained, the
insured must intend to injure the specific person or property in fact
injured.181 In effect there is no "transferred intent" rule. 8 Thus, if
an insured sets a fire intending to cause some loss to a structure and
as a consequence of the fire a wind shift causes another structure to
be consumed, the suggestion in United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. is that the exclusion does not apply.183 Similarly, if the fire con-
sumes the structure in which it was set and also results in the death
of an inhabitant, the apparent result is that the exclusion applies to
the property damage but not the personal injury claim!
Coupling the "some injury" rule with the refusal to apply the
"transferred intent" rule is illogical. In effect if defendant intends to
strike the decedent with his fist and the blow results in decedent's
death because he has an "eggshell" head, coverage is avoided because
"some injury" was the probable consequence of the blow. If, on the
181. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 159
Cal. App. 3d 277, 288-89, 205 Cal. Rptr. 460, 465 (1984) (distinguishing cases finding inten-
tionally brought-about injuries to be covered because "cited cases are generally concerned with
intentional acts ...committed ...without intent to harm the person actually injured")
(emphasis original) (footnote omitted).
182. Thus if D, intending to strike A, in fact, mistakenly or accidentally strikes B, the
claim by B against D is excluded under the policy. The majority of jurisdictions that have
considered the issue have not applied the "transferred intent" doctrine and have found B's
injuries to be unintended. See American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257 (D. Conn.
1965); Smith v. Moran, 61 111. App. 2d 157, 209 N.E.2d 18 (1965); but see Kraus v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 258 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Pa. 1966), aff d, 379 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1967).
183. See supra notes 174 and 181. The court clearly did not appreciate the conse-
quences of its rationale for in the decision it upheld the denial of coverage for losses to adjoin-
ing structures.
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other hand, defendant intends to strike the person next to the dece-
dent but the intended victim ducks and the defendant strikes the de-
cedent with the same result as above, coverage exists. This distinc-
tion makes absolutely no sense.
An injury substantially different from that intended should be
covered whether or not the difference is due to the fortuitous pres-
ence of another person or thing. The presence of an intended victim
who escapes unscathed is a weak justification for treating the in-
sured's actions as covered under the policy. In each case the compen-
sation goal is the same. The critical issue in either case is whether
the insured intended the injuries that in fact occurred. That basic
test should not be compromised by glosses on the rule that in effect
transform an intent test into a pure foreseeability test (the actual
injury should have been anticipated) or a penal test (coverage is de-
nied because "some injury" to someone or something was intended).
The "some injury" test also suffers in that it would sweep into
the exclusion for intentional acts many "high risk" activities where
some injury could be anticipated but the actual injury that occurred
was unforeseen and surely unintended. Outside the sexual abuse and
arson cases, California courts have taken a more pro-coverage ap-
proach than a "some injury" test would allow. For example, in
Pilcher v. New York Life Insurance Co.,"' the insured died of a
self-administered heroin overdose. The court held that where the
quantity of heroin injected was more than intended, the resulting
death was "unintended" and "unexpected." 185 Surely the self-admin-
istration of heroin involves the infliction of "some injury;" yet, in
Pilcher the court found the resulting death to be unintended, i.e.
apparently not the "same injury." Nor does it seem that the likely
subjective intent of the insured not to injure himself controls and
distinguishes Pilcher from sexual abuse cases such as Abraio.' s
Heroin is heavily regulated by both the state and federal govern-
ments. 187 Misuse generally subjects one to much heavier civil and
criminal penalties than does sexual misconduct. Surely use of heroin
gives rise to some "probability" of harm as does sexual misconduct
184. 25 Cal. App. 3d 717, 102 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1972).
185. Id. at 725, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 87. Pilcher involved the issue of whether death was
"accidental" within the contemplation of a "death-by-accidental-means" policy. Insurance
Code section 533 was not discussed by the court.
186. 683 F. Supp 220 (N.D. Cal. 1988), discussed at supra notes 160-61 and accompa-
nying text.
187. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11000-11058 (West 1981). Heroin is a
schedule I drug. Id. at § 11054(c)(11). See also 21 U.S.C. §§ 951-966 (West 1981). Heroin is
a schedule 1 drug. Id. at § 812.
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and would suggest a similar per se rule. Yet, such is not the case
either in California, as Pilcher evidences, or elsewhere.188 This is
inconsistent with the general rule that injuries caused by sexual mis-
conduct are intended.
One can, of course, provide flexibility by keeping the definition
of "injury" open. Thus, the intent to frighten can be distinguished
from the intent to injure; the intent to use drugs recreationally from
the intent to harm oneself or another; the intent to set a fire in a
trash can to warm oneself from the intent to burn a structure. This
approach, which is used by many courts, 89 simply accomplishes in-
directly what should be done directly, which is to relate intent to the
actual harm intended and limit the intentional act exclusion to the
losses actually contemplated by the insured.
Differences between accidental death cases and sexual miscon-
duct cases can also be explained by the inevitable differences in types
of insurance involved (life or accident insurance versus liability in-
surance) or differences in the specific language of the insurance pol-
icy.' 90 Yet, this explanation is ultimately unsatisfactory. The basic
issue is whether the loss, which the insured or his representative or
his beneficiary contends is covered, was intended or unintended.
Courts have developed a series of tests and rules that answer the
question of the insured's intent by reference to the type of loss in
certain areas (e.g., sexual misconduct) yet by reference to the in-
sured's actual intent in others (e.g., high risk activities, heroin use,
autoerotic asphyxiation, assault and battery). The development ap-
pears to be rather haphazard, with no perceivable difference between
heroin use, death for sex, and sexual misconduct, save for the fact
that the last, sexual misconduct, involves third parties as direct vic-
tims. Yet, all losses have their victims. In effect, the indirect victims
of the loss of an insured by heroin overdose can receive the benefits
of insurance but the direct victim of sexual abuse cannot. Similarly,
188. See Achampong, Death from Autoerotic Asphyxiation and the Double Indemnity
Clause in Life Insurance Policies: The Latest Round in Accidental Death Litigation, 21 AK-
RON L. REV. 191-93 (1987) (Autoerotic asphyxiation involves a deliberate reduction of oxygen
to the brain. In some people this apparently heightens sexual pleasure. The practice is often
accomplished through use of a noose with a knot that gives way when the body goes limp.
Death occurs when the knot fails).
189. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 159 Cal.
App. 3d 277, 289 n.5, 205 Cal. Rptr. 460, 467 n.5 (1984); Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Nestor,
4 Mich. App. 578, 145 N.W.2d 399 (1966) (child set fire to frighten inhabitants, fire spread
causing damage; indemnification allowed).
190. For example, Pilcher involves slight changes in policy language that allowed the
court to distinguish contrary precedents. Pilcher, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 717, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
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if the presence of third party victims is treated as legally significant,
then death by self-administered heroin overdose is deemed unin-
tended but if the insured "shoots up" a friend who dies, then death,
at least for coverage purposes, is treated as intended.
The legislature could of course prescribe such discrete distinc-
tions, if it wished. It is difficult, however, to reconcile the disparate
approaches under a standard that uses a common term, be it "will-
fully" for purposes of Insurance Code section 533 or "intended" and
"expected" for purposes of the standard policy exclusion. It would
appear to more consistent with the language of Insurance Code sec-
tion 533, a provision bereft of legislative history, and the standard
pro-coverage orientation of California courts to answer the issue of
the insured's intent by using the insured's actual intent rather than
some substitute, such as the type of act. This, again, does not read
the nature of the act out of the determination. Rather, it places it in
its proper perspective as a factual aid to the determination whether
the insured acted with the requisite intent to injure. Moreover, since
the primary purpose of the intentional acts exclusion is to deter, the
level of intent required would be an intent to cause some significant,
socially disapproved injury. This would operate to retain insurance
for practical jokers whose pranks go astray and preclude insurance
for arsonists whose blazes exceed their unreasonable expectations.
D. Mental Capacity To Formulate Intent
The second prong of the Clemmer intent test is mental capacity.
In order to come within the intentional act exclusion (policy and
statutory), the insured must have had the requisite mental capacity
to commit a "willful" act. The critical issue is what test is to be used
to determine whether the insured had the requisite mental capacity
and what are the burdens of proof with respect to the issue of mental
capacity. While it is generally conceded that whether an act is inten-
tional is a question different from whether the actor is responsible
for his act, courts vary widely in their assessment of the proper test
to be used to measure the actor's (here the insured's) capacity to be
responsible for his act.191
1. Insanity
In Congregation of Rodef Sholom v. American Motorists Insur-
191. See Globe Am. Casualty Co. v. Lyons, 131 Ariz. 337, 641 P.2d 251 (1981) (collect-
ing authorities); Johnson v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 232 Va. 340, 350 S.E.2d 616 (1986)
(collecting authorities).
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ance Co.,192 the insured was a 16 year old youth who set a fire in a
wastepaper basket in a classroom at the plaintiff synagogue. The fire
resulted in property damage of $48,770.01, a judgment for that
amount was entered, and the plaintiff then commenced an action
against the insurer, American Motorists Insurance (American), seek-
ing a declaration that American was liable for the loss under a
homeowner's policy under which the youth was an additional in-
sured.' 9 ' American disclaimed responsibility relying on an exclusion-
ary clause in the policy which provided: "Exclusions: (c) To injury,
sickness, disease, death or destruction caused intentionally by or at
the direction of the insured."' 94
The plaintiff contended that the exclusion should not be applied
because the insured lacked the requisite mental capacity to "inten-
tionally" cause property damage. There was testimony by a psychia-
trist who was of the opinion that the insured set the fire as a result
of an irresistible impulse.'95 The trial court had applied the
M'Naghton Test (could the insured distinguish between right and
wrong) and refused to instruct the jury in conformity with the irre-
sistible impulse test of insanity (does the insured suffer from a
mental defect which deprives him of the capacity to govern his con-
duct in accordance with reason . . . when he was impelled by an
impulse he did not have the power to resist).' 96 The Court of Ap-
peals held that both tests set an erroneous standard: "neither crimi-
nal standard is appropriate for determining whether an insured has
192. 91 Cal. App. 3d 690, 154 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1979).
193. The insurer had disclaimed coverage when the defense of the plaintiff's underlying
lawsuit had been tendered to it by the insured. Id. at 693, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 349. Under
Insurance Code section 11580 which relates to actions on insurance policies containing liability
provisions, before the third party may bring an action on the policy against an insurer, that
party must obtain a judgment against the insured. Muraoka v. Budget-Rent-A-Car, Inc., 160
Cal. App. 3d 107, 121, 206 Cal. Rptr. 476, 483 (1984).
194. Congregation of Rodef Sholom, 91 Cal. App. 3d at 693, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 349. An
identically worded exclusion had received a narrow construction in Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65
Cal. 2d 267, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1966); see supra notes 93-94 and accompany-
ing text. Gray received no mention in Congregation of Rodef Sholom.
195. (The psychiatrist] Lamers . . . testified that at the time of the fire Steven
[the insured] could distinguish between right and wrong, and could form a ra-
tional intent to do the act of starting a fire. However, Lamers also testified that
when Steven set the fire, he was "impelled by an impulse which he did not have
the power to resist." Lamers was of the opinion that Steven exhibited paranoid
tendencies of delusions and auditory hallucinations. He concluded that Steven
had a schizoid personality caused by mental disease which existed on the date
Steven started the synagogue fire.
Congregation of Rodef Shalom, 91 Cal. App. 3d at 693-94, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 349-50.
196. Id. at 698, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
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sufficient mental capacity so as to invoke the exclusionary clause. 19"
The court stated that the M'Naghton test was too narrow and the
"irresistible impulse" test was too broad."" The court adopted the
following:
If [the insured] was suffering from mental disease or defect
which deprived him of capacity to intend to set the fire and
cause the damage complained of, or which deprived him of the
capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with reason, then
he did not act intentionally ...."9
This test is a restatement of language in Clemmer v. Hartford In-
surance Co.,200 finding no error in a jury instruction which focused
on the insured's ability to harbor the requisite "preconceived design
to inflict injury" to come within the section 533 exclusion.20' The
court in Clemmer did not consider what test of mental capability
should be used; indeed the test adopted in Congregation of Rodef
Sholoin rejects any role for moral responsibility and is in this sense
strikingly inconsistent with the "harbored a preconceived design to
injure" test which has been grafted onto Insurance Code section 533.
The "harbor a design to injure" language suggests that moral
awareness and moral responsibility must be present on the part of
the insured.20 2
The test articulated in Congregation of Rodef Sholom is not a
test that focuses the issue of mental capacity in the formats usually
197. Id. at 697, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
198. Id. at 698, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
199. Id. at 697, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 352 (emphasis added). The test adopted parallels
superficially the ALI test (does the person suffering from a mental defect or disease possess the
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law). The absence of a moral component in the court's test distinguishes it from
the ALl standard. Other jurisdictions have applied a similar test. See Johnson v. Ins. Co. of
North America, 232 Va. 340, 350 S.E.2d 616 (1986) (no coverage where insured shot the
victim although the insured was mentally ill and capable of differentiating between right and
wrong. The insured knew of the nature and quality of his act and intended to do it).
200. 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1978).
201. Id. at 887, 587 P.2d at 1100, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
202. See Russ-Field Corp. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 164 Cal. App. 2d 83, 96, 330
P.2d 432, 439-40 (1958) (A "wilful act" as the term is used in Insurance Code section 533 is
conduct "more blameworthy than the sort of misconduct involved in ordinary negli-
gence ...."); Capachi v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 843, 849, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 326 (1963) (the word "wilful" as used in Insurance Code section 533 may be said
"to connote an act done with malevolence"); see also City Prods. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co.,
88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 36 n.3, 151 Cal. Rptr. 494, 497 n.3 (1979); California Shoppers, Inc. v.
Royal Globe Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 1, 32, 221 Cal. Rptr. 171, 186 (1985) ("wilful" as
used in Insurance Code section 533 is equivalent to "malice in fact," e.g., a wish to vex, annoy,
or injure another person).
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encountered in the law. Since those tests are most commonly applied
to determine criminal responsibility, the tests tend to reflect in whole
or in part a concern for moral responsibility. The ability to distin-
guish "right" from "wrong," the ability to appreciate the "wrongful-
ness" of one's conduct, and the inability to withstand an "irresistible
impulse" all bespeak of a moral sensibility of men and women as
creatures free and able to consciously choose good from evil. The test
espoused in Congregation of Rodef Sholom avoids any inclusion of
moral sensibility into its test of mental capacity. It is, at root, a func-
tional test: did the insured understand that striking a match and
throwing it into a wastepaper basket would create a fire? If so, the
insured possessed what might be called the requisite "arsonist's in-
tent" so as to fall within the intentional act exclusion.20 3 If, on the
other hand, the insured understood that striking a match and throw-
ing it into a full wastepaper basket would not result in a fire because
the match would burn out as it hit the basket, then the insured
would not possess the requisite "arsonist's intent."
Congregation of Rodef Sholom was actually a harbinger of a
similar result that the California Supreme Court would reach in a
case involving a standard suicide clause which sought to exclude cov-
erage where death was brought about by "suicide, sane or insane."
In Searle v. Allstate Insurance Co.,2"4 the court found that the
clause, while unambiguous, did not abrogate all requirements that
the insured have some mental capacity to intentionally cause a loss.
Paralleling Congregation of Rodef Sholom, the court adopted a test
of mental capacity that avoided any inclusion of moral sensibility on
the part of the insured to the consequences of his act:
[I]nsanity or other mental derangement does not negate suicidal
intent if the decedent is shown to have performed the self-de-
structive act with an understanding of its physical nature and
consequences. Proof that the act was impelled by an irresistible
203. Although Congregation of RodefSholom involved specifically a contractual exclu-
sion for losses intentionally brought about, the court's reference to the statutory exclusion (In-
surance Code section 533) strongly suggest that a similar test of mental capacity would be used
for the statutory exclusion. See Escobedo v. Travelers Ins. Co., 227 Cal. App. 2d 353, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 645 (1964): "The type of wilfulness which exempts an insurance carrier from liability is
that which is exemplified by a driver wilfully running down a pedestrian in the street for
whatever reason. If he negligently runs him down but not wilfully, then the insurance is appli-
cable." Id. at 360, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
204. 38 Cal. 3d 425, 696 P.2d 1308, 212 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1985). Searle does not involve
the intentional act exclusion. But as the latest pronouncement by the California Supreme
Court on the issue of mental capacity in the context of insurance, it will, no doubt, be ex-
amined by lower courts on the issue presented here.
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impulse would merely establish that "self-destruction was the
very result intended, albeit by a deranged mind. '2 0 5
Under Searle, if the insured puts a loaded gun to his head and pulls
the trigger knowing that a bullet will be propelled into his head and
cause his death, the insured possesses the requisite suicidal intent; it
matter's not that he cannot appreciate the wrongfulness of the taking
of his own life or that he cannot resist the impulse to take his own
life. If, on the other hand, the insured due to his derangement, be-
lieves the loaded gun is really the "hand of God" which will impart
to him everlasting life, he probably lacks the requisite suicidal
intent.2 o0
Both Congregation of Rodef Sholom and Searle articulate a
"mental capacity" test that has not been used in California for many
years.2°7 In effect the two decisions adopt the "wild beast" theory
that was rejected in M'Naghton. There is little to differentiate the
"arsonist intent/suicidal intent" tests from the "wild beast" test
which holds that a person lacks mental capacity to form a specific
intent only when he is totally deprived of his understanding and
memory and does not know what he is doing.208
205. Id. at 441, 696 P.2d at 1408, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
206. Searle was decided solely on the basis of the policy language and a minority line of
decisions that read a "minimal" intent requirement into the standard suicide exclusion. Id. at
440, 696 P.2d at 1407, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 475. The court did not mention either Insurance
Code section 533 or Congregation of Rodef Shalom.
207. M'Naghton has a long usage in California. Although the M'Naghton Rule was
replaced by the ALl standard in People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 275 (1978), M'Naghton was reestablished in California in 1982 as a result of the adop-
tion of Proposition 8 (Constitutional Ballot Initiative). See People v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765,
704 P.2d 752, 217 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1985) (discussing history of M'Naghton in California and
the affect of adoption of Proposition 8).
208. See generally R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 450-51 (3d ed. 1982).
Suicide clauses, such as raised in Searle, do not really raise the issue of "intent"; rather, the
critical issue is whether self-destruction was a sufficiently real probability of the insured's act
as to warrant denial of insurance benefits. The use of the language "sane or insane" represents
an effort by insurers to remove the issue of the insured's mental capacity ("sanity") from the
dispute. Even where they are successful, there still remains the issue whether the insured
committed suicide. For example, assume the insured points a loaded gun to his head knowing
that a bullet propelled into his brain will result in his death. If he pulls the trigger, he has the
requisite "suicidal intent" required by Searle. But what if the insured only knew those facts in
the abstract; in the actual case let us hypothesize that the insured believed he was pointing a
realistic toy replica at his head. Or assume the insured thought there was no bullet in the
firing chamber. In both cases, the resulting death is an accident not suicide even in a jurisdic-
tion that does not follow Searle. Both examples lack the element of intended self-destruction
that is the essential element of suicide.
The difficulty with Searle does not appear to be that it creates an "intent" test where the
policy exclusion specifically negates coverage in absolutist terms. Searle does not do more than
create a test for recognizing the occurrence of suicide, as opposed to accidental death. The
INSURANCE COVERAGE
Legal tests for gauging mental capacity which have been devel-
oped for use in the field of criminal law, where assessing moral re-
sponsibility is a major objective in many cases, should not be un-
thinkingly applied to the civil side of the law. However, it is also
inappropriate to apply a test of mental capacity that does not take
into account the goals and purposes that underlay the intentional act
exclusion. Mental'capacity does not exist in a vacuum. Its determi-
nation can only be made against a backdrop of advancing the goals
and policies that underlie the intentional act exclusion. The appro-
priate test for measuring the mental capacity of the insured to form
the requisite "intent to injure" must be consistent with the under-
stood goals and purposes of the exclusion. In this respect the basic
test articulated in Congregation of Rodef Sholom is inadequate.
The true goal of the intentional act exclusion is deterrence al-
though courts continue to view punishment as a major purpose of the
exclusion.209 Even if the goal of punishment is accepted it argues for
a stricter not a looser mental capacity requirement. To vindicate a
goal of punishment the person to be punished, who has caused the
loss, must deserve the punishment inflicted and be able to appreciate
the fact that because of his misconduct he is being denied indemnifi-
cation. If the above is not met, the infliction of punishment is wholly
divorced of its retributivist and educational function. Indeed, given
the stated goals underlying the intentional act exclusion, a strong
case can be made that a rigorous standard for mental capacity, con-
sistent with the ALI test, ought to be used that would make certain
that the insured would understand why he was being punished and
why and how he should conform his conduct to that which is socially
desirable. As so formulated, this would also suggest that the appro-
priate point in time to measure "mental capacity" would depend on
the goal and purpose being advanced. The deterrence goal would
suggest that the appropriate point in time for determination is the
time the conduct giving rise to the loss occurred; the punishment goal
would suggest that the appropriate point in time is when the punish-
ment is inflicted.210
insurers' real objection to Searle is not its definition of "suicidal intent," which is really just a
definition of suicide. Rather, they object to the Court's allowance of evidence going to the
insured's state of mind. This evidence may suggest to the jury that the insured's mental capac-
ity to formulate a moral capacity to commit suicide is a relevant factor.
209. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text and infra notes 263-70, 273. Pun-
ishment is a goal in the sense that the insured would stand ultimately responsible for the loss
inflicted. If the insured is judgment-proof, then punishment is illusory.
210. Cf Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (unconstitutional to execute someone
when he is insane, in large part because retributive value of punishment is so low). Since the
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2. Voluntary Intoxication As Affecting Intent to Injure
It has not been decided in California whether alcohol or sub-
stance abuse can negate the requisite intent the insured must possess
to allow an insurer to invoke the intentional act exclusion. While
Clemmer and Congregation of Rodef Sholom state that the criminal
test of insanity does not determine the insured's mental capacity to
form the requisite intent to defeat insurance coverage, the decisions
are not clear as to the test to be applied if the criminal tests for
mental capacity are not used. Jurisdictions have split on the issue
whether intoxication can impair the mental capacity needed to form
the intent to injure. Most jurisdictions do allow, however, evidence
on the issue of whether intoxication impaired the insured's mental
capacity to form the requisite "intent."21 The rationale for the ma-
jority approach is set forth in Burd v. Sussex Mutual Insurance
Co. :212
With respect to voluntary intoxication, the public policy consid-
erations applicable to a criminal prosecution are not decisive as
to liability insurance coverage. In criminal matters there is rea-
son to deal cautiously with a plea of intoxication, and this to
protect the innocent from attack by drunken men . . . .But
other values are involved in the insurance controversy. The ex-
clusion of intentional injury from coverage stems from a fear
that an individual might be encouraged to inflict injury inten-
tionally if he was assured against the dollar consequences. Pull-
ing the other way is the public interest that the victim be com-
pensated, and the victim's rights being derivative from the
insured's, the victim is aided by the narrowest view of the policy
exclusion consistent with the purpose of not encouraging an in-
tentional attack. 213
If the "preconceived design to injure" test is to be consistently
applied, it would seem that intoxication could take the case out of
form of punishment is denial of insurance coverage, the most appropriate time for assessing
mental capacity would appear to be the time of trial when the determination of coverage is
made. At this point in time, if the insured lacks the mental capacity to understand both the fact
that he is being punished and the reason for which he is being punished, one must ask how a
punishment goal is being met.
211. See Annotation, Liability Insurance: Intoxication or Other Mental Incapacity
Avoiding Application of Clause in Liability Policy Specifically Exempting Coverage of Injury
or Damage Caused Intentionally by or at Direction of Insured, 33 A.L.R. 4th 983 (1984)
(collecting cases).
212. 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970).
213. Id. at 390, 267 A.2d at 15.
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the intentional injury exclusion,214 unless it could be said that the
insured intentional and voluntarily intoxicated himself to fortify his
resolve to inflict injury on another.
In this regard Taylor v. Superior Court2 15 is significant. There
the court held that punitive damages could be recovered from intoxi-
cated drivers. The court did not accept the position of former Associ-
ate Justice Clark who, in dissent, contended that recognition of puni-
tive damages for injuries caused by intoxicated drivers would allow
insurers to avoid coverage by invoking Insurance Code section
533.216 Denying the insured the right to present evidence that her
intoxication negated her mental capacity to harbor the required
"preconceived design to injure" would likewise run counter to the
broad pro-coverage policy articulated in numerous California deci-
sions construing insurance contracts. It was surely contemplated
under Taylor that the fact of intoxication did not avoid insurance
coverage as to non-punitive, compensatory damage claims.
Taylor also illustrates that a distinction should be invoked be-
tween (1) cases which seek to assess whether the requisite intent in
fact exists from (2) cases where public policy may preclude introduc-
tion of an intent-negating defense such as diminished capacity.
17
214. In general, cases dealing with a substance abuse/diminished capacity defense to the
insurer's claim of "no coverage," involve contract exclusions.
215. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
216. Id. at 903, 598 P.2d at 862, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 701. (Clark, J., dissenting).
217. For example, in 1982 the people passed Proposition 8, a ballot constitutional initia-
tive. One of the provisions of.the Proposition, subsequently codified at California Penal Code
section 25 restricted the diminished capacity defense, a defense which, had been substantially
.expanded by California courts in the 1970's. The Proposition, as codified, provides:
(a) The defense of diminished capacity is hereby abolished. In a criminal action,
as well as any juvenile court proceeding, evidence concerning an accused per-
son's intoxication, trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect shall not be admissi-
ble to show or negate capacity to form the particular purpose, intent, motive,
malice aforethought, knowledge, or other mental state required for the commis-
sion of the crime charged.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(a) (West 1988) (emphasis added). Although prior to the adoption of
Proposition 8, California Penal Code section 22 had precluded use of intoxication as a defense
to a criminal offense, the courts allowed intoxication to negate the specific intent element when
that element was part of the offense. See, e.g., People v. Foster, 19 Cal. App. 3d 649, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 94 (1971) (voluntary intoxication may not be considered when offense charged is general
intent offense (offense requiring nothing more than intent to do proscribed act), but voluntary
intoxication may be considered in determining whether particular purpose, motive or intent
actuated the defendant; where specific intent is a necessary element of the offense, the trier-of-
fact may consider the fact of the defendant's voluntary intoxication as a defense to the specific
intent offense). This entire area is complicated by the fact that prior to the adoption of Pro-
position 8, the legislature substantially restricted the defense of diminished capacity (CAL. PE-
NAL CODE §§ 22, 28, 29) (West 1988), and thus there are overlapping statutory provisions.
See generally People v. Whitler, 171 Cal. App. 3d 337, 214 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1985). This
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Diminished capacity may be eliminated or restricted as a defense for
reasons of reliability or public policy;218 yet, such a course is nor-
mally not presumed. Thus, in People v. Westmore 19 the California
Supreme Court stated that "any proof tending to show that a certain
mental condition could not exist is relevant and should be admissible
to show that it did not exist." 2  Since the application of the inten-
tional act exclusion should turn on the assessment of the insured's
moral responsibility for the loss, it is appropriate that the Westmore
test, likewise developed in the context of assessing moral responsibil-
ity, should be used.
E. Vicarious Liability
A person may be legally responsible in damages because of the
misconduct of another. For example, under California law the prin-
cipal is liable for intentional torts of the agent committed within the
course and scope of the latter's agency or employment.2 ' The ques-
tion arises whether the principal may secure insurance for liability
imposed on it as a result of the deliberate misconduct of its agents. In
this regard, indemnification for losses caused by willful acts is not
contrary to public policy where the liability of the insured is vicari-
ous."' Thus, the benefits to the insurer of the intentional acts exclu-
sion are often effectively negated whenever the liability of one of sev-
eral co-insureds is vicarious, unless the animus of the active
wrongdoer is attributed to the passive wrongdoers.
Courts frequently reject attribution of the "intent to injure"
possessed by one insured to other co-insureds. For example, where
adverse reaction to the diminished capacity defense was not limited to California. See Insanity
Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see generally United
States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 903 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 710 (1988).
218. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 152 Cal. App. 3d 961, 968, 199 Cal. Rptr. 848, 852
(1984) (addressing the legislative restriction of diminished capacity as a defense and its use to
mitigate punishment).
219. 22 Cal. 3d 218, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978).
220. Id. at 324, 583 P.2d at 1312, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
221. See generally 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, AGENCY AND EM-
PLOYMENT § 135 (9th ed. 1987) ("Liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior extends
to malicious acts and other intentional torts of an employee committed within the scope of his
employment.") (collecting cases).
222. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Turlock, 170 Cal. App. 3d 988, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 796 (1985); City Prods. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co, 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 151 Cal. Rptr.
494 (1979); Dart Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 484 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1973). One
court has gone so far as to hold that indemnification in such situations furthers public policy
even where punitive damages are involved. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Fish, 122
N.H. 711, 713, 451 A.2d 358, 360 (1982).
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family members are co-insureds and the liability of one insured for
her deliberate misconduct is direct and primary and the liability of
the other insured(s) is derivative and secondary, indemnification is
common. In this context California courts have held that the inten-
tional act exclusion does not bar indemnification of the insured(s)
whose liability is secondary and derivative.223 In American States
Insurance Co. v. Borbor by Borbor,22' a husband and wife operated
a nursery school. The husband sexually molested a number of the
children during the period the American States policy was in force.
The husband was convicted of child molestation; thereupon, a num-
ber of the children and their parents sued the husband and wife for
infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery and fraud. The
court found that the wife was a separate insured under the policy
and that the husband's willful acts would not be attributed to her for
purposes of Insurance Code section 533:
[That the wife] may be indemnified under the American States
policy does no violence to this public policy. She did not en-
courage, aid, or abet her husband's willful, tortious activities.
She did not ratify his acts. [The wife] may be liable for what
the district court suggested might have been "negligent . . . su-
pervision," or for a negligent failure to investigate facts which
existed but to which the district court stated she may have
"closed her eyes to . . . deliberately avoid learning the whole
truth." But neither [the wife's] negligence, if any, nor her vica-
rious liability for [the husband's] willful acts, precludes insur-
ance coverage under California Insurance Code § 533.225
Similarly, in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Kartsone226 the
arsonist-husband died as a result of injuries sustained in the arson
fire he started. The court held that his wife, an innocent co-insured,
was not barred by Insurance Code section 533 to the extent of her
interest-which was the entire estate because of her husband's death.
As Kartsone implies, the result may be different if the wrong-
doing insured stands to benefit directly from the insurance proceeds.
Thus, in Norman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,27 the court
denied recovery to the innocent co-insured where the insured prem-
223. See Arenson v. National Auto. & Casualty, Inc., 45 Cal. 2d 81, 84, 286 P.2d 816,
818 (1955) (Insurance Code section 533 has no application to a situation where the insured is
not personally at fault; indemnification allowed for parent whose liability was based on an
arson fire started by his child at school).
224. 826 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1987).
225. Id. at 894 (footnote omitted).
226. 510 F. Supp. 856 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
227. 804 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Texas law).
1990]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ises were community property of the innocent insured and her co-
insured arsonist husband and the husband was still alive and thus
could benefit from the insurance proceeds. 22" Thus, we might expect
courts to be less willing to attribute the wrongdoer's intent to inno-
cent insureds in liability insurance contexts since the benefits of in-
surance coverage will usually go to the third party victims of the
wrongdoer's conduct.
A problem over the proper scope of attribution also exists when
a business is owned by several persons, e.g., through the form of a
corporation or partnership, and one of the owners intentionally
causes a loss. Although the case law is not entirely consistent, a de-
veloping theme appears to limit imputation of wrongdoing to the
other "ipnocent" owners of the business to situations where the
wrongdoer(s) constitute a majority ownership interest229 or possess
effective management and control of the entity. 2 0
There is an inherent conflict between the social policies of (1)
providing indemnification for insureds who have contracted for such
protection and (2) deterring socially undesirable conduct as evi-
denced by intentionally induced losses. Allowing innocent insureds to
recover the full value of indemnification clearly lessens the deter-
rence value associated with intentional act exclusions; however,
freely imputing "intent" to innocent insureds denies them the bene-
fits of the indemnification they have purchased. The approach
adopted by a number of courts of limiting imputation to all insureds
to situations where the wrongdoing insured(s) constitute the majority
228. Ironically, the federal court felt that alternatives other than outright denial of all
benefits under the policy existed, but did not feel that a federal court sitting in diversity should
implement those possible solutions. There is dicta in Erlin-Lawler Enters., Inc. v. Fire Ins.
Exch., 267 Cal. App. 2d 381, 73 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1968) that supports the same result under
California law. See infra note 230.
229. See generally Witten, "Barn Burning" and What Can Be Done to Prevent It, 22
TORT & INS. L.J. 511 (1986). In Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lott, 460 F.2d 82 (5th Cir.
1972), the wrongdoing insured was a majority owner but the court did not impute wrongdoing
to the other insureds since the wrongdoer had been frozen out of any recovery of insurance
proceeds. Thus, imputation would simply prejudice the interests of innocent co-insureds and
creditors.
230. See Vicksburg Furniture Mfg., Ltd. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 625 F.2d 1167
(5th Cir. 1980) (wrongdoers owned only 25% of company but possessed effective management
control). But see Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Queen City Bus & Transfer Co., 3 F.2d 784
(4th Cir. 1925) (arson fire instigated by 25% owner not imputed to others where wrongdoer
frozen out of insurance proceeds). There is dicta in Erlin-Lawler which states that a corpora-
tion could not recover under an insurance policy for its fire loss if the loss were the result of
arson perpetrated by the beneficial owner of practically all of the stock of the corporation and
who had absolute control and management of the corporation. 267 Cal. App. 2d at 385-86, 73
Cal. Rptr. at 185.
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owners of the insured business or have effective management control
has substantial merit. Minority owners and passive investors must
assume some responsibility for losses incurred by majority owners
and controlling persons, at least to the extent the issue is whether
they must bear the loss or some third party (here the insurer) must
indemnify them for a loss intentionally caused by the majority own-
ers or controlling persons. Unlike the third party victim cases, the
involvement of the minority owners in the situation is voluntary, not
involuntary. Moreover the insurer must be able to deal with some
person or persons who represent all the insureds and whose actions
and conduct will be imputed to all insureds. Absent such a relation-
ship, the insurer simply cannot determine the relative risks assumed
under the insurance contract. In this context, limiting attribution to
situations where controlling persons have procured the insurance and
intentionally brought about the loss provides a "bright line" test that
enhances risk assessment and encourages the marketing and
purchase of insurance.
The alternative approach used by some courts of denying cover-
age only to the wrongdoing insured must be used cautiously. The
approach is surely sensible when applied in those contexts where
indemnification will otherwise be made available, as where the inno-
cent insureds constitute a majority interest or possess effective con-
trol. It is questionable whether the approach should be applied
where the loss is caused by insureds who constitute majority owners
or possess control. First, such an approach ignores the fact that the
persons representing the entity have breached the insurance contract
and public policy as espoused in Insurance Code section 533. Some-
one must speak and stand for the entity and those who have volunta-
rily elected to stand behind that "someone" must accept the costs as
readily as they accept the benefits. Second, if the search for indemni-
fication is carried so far as to permit full recovery under the policy
whenever a single innocent insured can be found, the insurer is com-
pelled to write a much broader exclusion that nullifies coverage
whenever the loss is intentionally brought about by any insured
rather than an insured.2"' Rather than such an all or nothing ap-
proach, the use of the majority owner/controlling person test as a
231. The use of the term "any" rather than "an" may preclude recovery for all co-
insureds whenever the loss was intentionally brought about by any one of the insureds. See
supra note 111. The above recalls, to paraphrase Mark Twain, that the difference between
the right word and the almost-right word is the difference between "electric" and "electric
chair." This opportunity does not exist where the parties are not co-insureds but have each
obtained their separate insurance.
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line of demarcation represents an appropriate compromise point,
which will, in many if not most instances, effectuate both indemnifi-
cation and deterrence goals. 282
V. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF THE APPLICATION OF
INTENTIONAL ACT EXCLUSIONS TO PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
The determination whether an insurer must indemnify its in-
sured for a punitive damages award entered against the insured
raises three critical issues: first, is a punitive damage award within
the coverage provision(s) of the policy; second, does the policy's in-
tentional act exclusion effectively negate or withdraw coverage for
punitive damage awards; and, third, does the statutory exclusion for
losses willfully brought about negate coverage for punitive damage
awards. To the extent that resolution of the above issues results in
the denial of indemnification for the punitive damage award, a re-
lated issue arises whether the no indemnification policy extends to
parallel awards, such as treble damage awards, civil penalties, liqui-
dated damages, and the like. Because California courts have broadly,
albeit wrongly, applied the statutory exclusion for intentional acts to
negate insurability for punitive damages, there are no California de-
cisions which address the first and second considerations.
A. Punitive Damages and Basic Coverage Clauses
The standard coverage clause in many liability policies provides
coverage "[i]f a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured
for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by
an occurrence to which this coverage applies .... -"' The terms
"property damage" and "bodily injury" are also defined in the stan-
dard policy.28' The initial inquiry is thus whether the punitive dam-
ages constitute a type of loss to the insured that is covered under the
standard policy language.
Punitive damages are, in theory, not intended to compensate the
injured party but rather are intended to punish the wrongdoer and
232. Minority owners and non-controlling persons will be deterred since they will not
share in the indemnification and will be subject to subrogation claims asserted by the insurer.
See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
233. This language is drawn from the standard ISO Homeowners 4 Special Form (ed.
4-89). It is essentially repeated in other standard ISO Forms, such as the Commercial General
Liability Coverage Form (eds. 11-85).
234. "Bodily injury" is defined as "bodily harm, sickness or disease, including required
care, loss of services and death resulting therefrom." "Property damage" means "physical in-
jury to or destruction of tangible property, including loss of use of [the] property." Id.
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thereby deter her and others from engaging in conduct deemed so-
cially reprehensible.2" 5 While punitive damages clearly constitute
•"damages" in contexts other than insurance, 86 it is unclear whether
they do so within the purview of the standard ISO language noted
above. The problem is whether to read the term "damages" as lim-
ited to "bodily injury damages" and/or "property damages" or
whether to read the term as sufficiently broad to encompass punitive
damages even with the "bodily injury"/"property damage"
qualifiers.
Courts taking the first approach treat the qualifying language
as controlling.2"" Under this approach, the terms "bodily injury" and
"property damage"2 8 tie the range of damages subject to indemnifi-
cation to the coverage clause and define the types of damages that are
covered. For courts adopting this approach, punitive damages, given
their non-compensatory orientation, simply do not fit within the
235. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1989); Neal v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 928 n.13, 582 P.2d 980, 990 n.13, 143 Cal. Rptr. 389, 399 n.13
(1978). Professor Ellis has identified three circumstances where punitive damages are compen-
satory or compensation enhancing: (1) where there is a strong likelihood that normal damages
do not measure the loss accurately; (2) where there is substantial difficulty in detecting the
existence of the injury; and (3) where incentives are needed to stimulate litigation because
losses relative to costs of litigation discourage redress. See Ellis, Fairness & Efficiency in the
Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982).
236. Thus Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "damages" as "the
estimated reparation in money for detriment or injury sustained; compensation or satisfaction
imposed by law for a wrong or injury caused by a violation of a legal right." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 571 (3d ed. 1967).
237. See, e.g., Cavin's, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 27 N.C. App. 698, 220 S.E.2d
403 (1975); Brown v. Western Casualty Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
238. Bodily injury even in the broadest sense possibly requires some injury to bodily
integrity. For example, courts disagree whether the term "bodily injury" encompasses "non
physical, emotional harm." Compare American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Church Schools, 645 F.
Supp. 628, 632 (E.D. Va. 1986) (bodily injury coverage does not cover claims for purely
emotional distress) with Levy v. Duclaux, 324 So. 2d 1, 9-10 (La. Ct. App. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 328 So. 2d 887-88 (La. 1976); County of Chemung v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 130
Misc. 2d 648, 650-51, 496 N.Y.S.2d 933, 935-36 (1985) (term "bodily injury in an insurance
policy does not avoid coverage for emotional distress); cf. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Stuntman, Inc., 861 F.2d 203, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1988) (emotional or mental injuries are not
inextricably linked to bodily injury under California law). The disagreement is, however, over
whether physical harm to the body is required. It is difficult to equate punitive damages with
"bodily injury" under either view. Similarly, while courts disagree over the scope of "property
damage" (compare Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352-55 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988) (under Maryland law environmental clean-up costs
are not covered) with New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp.
1359, 1365-67 (D. Del. 1987) (under Delaware law, environmental "clean-up costs" are cov-
ered)), the nature of the loss is inherently tied to the property and its restoration, repair or
valuation. See, e.g., Gulf Ins. Co. v. The L.A. Effects Group, Inc., 827 F.2d 574, 577 (9th Cir.
1987).
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range of meanings that can reasonably and legitimately be given to
the terms "bodily injury" or "property damage."
Most courts however do not follow the above approach. Rather
they treat the term "damages" as definitive.2" 9 The terms "bodily
injury" and "property damage" rather than limiting the term "dam-
ages," appear merely to identify a trigger necessary to initiate cover-
age but do not limit the scope of coverage. Thus, as long as the puni-
tive damages are based on a covered event, here "bodily injury" or
"property damage," the punitive damages award falls within the
coverage clause. This results even where the reason for the award is
not to compensate because of the existence of a covered event but to
deter the insured and others from allowing a similar event to occur
again.
An insurance policy may provide an unqualified definition of
"damages" and this, of course, simplifies the analysis. Thus, an in-
sured may seek and obtain coverage for "economic losses he may be
liable for," rather than coverage based on the standard ISO language
which uses the "bodily injury"/"property damage" terminology. In
such situations, the insurer's use of the broader coverage language,
which references the insured's potential legal obligation as the means
for defining the scope of coverage,'" negates the insurer's claim that
punitive damages are not contractually covered. In such cases, if the
insurer wishes to avoid indemnification it must rest its case on a
specific policy exclusion or public policy.
B. Punitive Damages and Policy Exclusions
If an insurance policy specifically excludes coverage for punitive
damages, and assuming the exclusion is not inconspicuous or defec-
tive in some way that allows the court to ignore exclusions,241 the
239. See, e.g., Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621, 319 S.E.2d 217 (1984);
Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 168 W. Va. 172, 283 S.E.2d 227 (1981); Harrell v. Travelers In-
dem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977); Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d
133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383
S.W.2d 1 (1964).
240. For example, a legal malpractice policy may provide coverage as follows: "[Insurer]
agrees to pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally obli-
gated to pay as damages as a result of [claims made against the Insured] .... " The language
is taken from a specimen legal malpractice policy offered by Lawyers' Mutual Insurance Co.
241. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text; see generally Annotation, Liability
Isurance Coverage As Extending to Liability for Punitive or Exemplary Damages, 20
A.L.R. 3d 343 (1968); Mazza, 311 N.C. at 630, 319 S.E.2d at 223; Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218, 226 n.13, 397 N.E.2d 737, 743 n.13, 422
N.Y.S.2d 47, 52 n.13 (1979) (collecting cases and authorities).
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exclusion will be enforced. There is no requirement that insurers
write coverage for punitive damages.2" 2
Although many insurance policies contain a specific punitive
damages exclusion, many more do not. On the surface this may ap-
pear surprising but it can be explained by several factors. First, the
majority of states do not as a matter of public policy prohibit insur-
ance for punitive damages. 43 In these jurisdictions insurers may of-
fer coverage for punitive damages awards entered against their in-
sureds. Second, punitive damages cannot be treated as a unitary
concept. In many jurisdictions a principal's vicarious liability for the
misconduct of its agent may be sufficient to allow for the imposition
of a punitive damage award against the principal.244 Consequently, a
blanket exclusion for punitive damages may not serve the insurance
needs of the insured-principal. In such circumstances, either to meet
market need or competition for the insured's business, the insurer
may be willing to provide coverage for some punitive damages
awards, at least up to policy limits. Thus, a blanket exclusion will be
avoided and specific exclusions will be used in order to control the
types of punitive damage awards for which the insurer will provide
coverage.
The standard policy exclusion for intentional acts suggested by
the ISO does not per se exclude coverage for punitive damages.245 To
avoid indemnification, the insurer must establish that coverage is ne-
gated by reference to the nature and consequences of the insured's
conduct that resulted in the loss rather than by reference to the legal
remedy made available to redress that misconduct. 246
Because policy exclusions operate under judicial suspicion, the
situation confronting insurers is not comforting to them. The market
242. It is frequently stated that an insurer has the right to limit coverage as long as the
restriction is not contrary to public policy. See, e.g., Public Employees Ins. Co. v. Mitchell,
173 Cal. App. 3d 814, 817, 219 Cal. Rptr. 129, 130 (1985).
243. This is said to be the majority rule in Prell Hotel Corp. v. Antonacci, 86 Nev. 390,
469 P.2d 399 (1970) and Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 271 Or. 430, 532 P.2d 790
(1975).
244. There is a state-by-state compilation in J. GHsARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE, Table 5-1 (1981), which identifies those states which hold
the principal liable for a punitive damage award based on the agent's misconduct. The juris-
dictions do divide on the issue whether pure vicarious liability will be applied or whether some
complicity will be required of the principal which contributed to the injury. Id. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1965) which argues for the more restricted approach.
245. See, e.g., Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973).
246. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 204, 347 N.E.2d 624, 383
N.Y.S.2d 263 (1976) (policy exclusion for loss "caused intentionally by or at the direction of
the insured" negated coverage for claim based on alleged defamation published "falsely,
wilfully and maliciously with intent to injure").
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requires that some coverage for punitive damages be available to the
insured. Yet efforts by insurers to cabin the risk assumed is most
difficult."4 7 Under such circumstances insurers would prefer a legal
determination that would fix the scope of liability insurers can as-
sume for a punitive damages award sustained against their insured.
A legal determination avoids the problems inherent in attempting to
establish limitations by contract drafting. 48 No court has yet held a
judicial determination to be subject to the same rules of construction
as applied to terms found in insurance policies. In California, insur-
ers have received a series of favorable judicial decisions that have
largely removed punitive damages from insurability even if both in-
surer and insured wish initially249 to insure the risk.
247. The use of conduct-based exclusions rather than remedy-based exclusions also
means that policy obligations other than indemnification, such as the duty to defend the in-
sured, must invariably be assumed by the insurer. Litigation costs being high, the obligation to
provide the insured with a defense can be a significant expense to the insured, often exceeding
the amount of any possible indemnity. That this is the case can be inferred from the number of
instances insurers are reported to have attempted to pay policy limits to secure a discharge of
their duty to defend. Compare Denham v. LaSalle-Madison Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576 (7th Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 871 (1948) (insurer may terminate defense obligation by tender
of policy limits) with Conway v. Country Casualty Ins. Co., 92 Ill. 2d 388, 442 N.E.2d 245
(1982) (contra). This problem has received sustained attention in the asbestos cases. See, e.g.,
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburg Corning Corp., 553 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 150 Mont. 182, 433 P.2d 795 (1967). The
issue is complicated by changes in the standard policy language adopted by the ISO in 1966
(see Van Vugt, Termination of the Insurer's Duty to Defend by Exhaustion of Policy Limits,
44 INS. COUNSEL J. 254 (1977)) and the growth of the doctrine of conforming policy language
to the reasonable expectations of the insured. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see
Gross v. LLoyds of London Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 78, 358 N.W.2d 266 (1984) (insurer not
allowed to invoke policy provision allowing it to terminate defense on tender of policy limits
where provision was not accompanied with sufficient notice to apprise insured that insured's
reasonable expectation that prior policy controlled insurer's duty to defend was no longer
valid). In Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 162 Cal. App. 3d 939, 208 Cal. Rptr. 806
(1984), the court compelled the insurer to continue with the defense of its insured even though
policy limits had been paid and the only claim remaining against the insured was for punitive
damages. The court held that the fact that the insurer was required to undertake the defense
because part of the claim was covered created the reasonable expectation on the part of the
insured that the insurer would see the case through to its conclusion even as to non-covered
claims. Id. at 947-48, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 811-12.
248. For example, in Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 388 A.2d 603
(1978), the insurer sought a declaration that the insured's setting of an arson fire which re-
sulted in the death of a resident of the insured premises was not covered by the insurance
policy. Although the policy apparently did contain an intentional act exclusion, the insurer
purposefully resisted raising any policy defense and relied instead on a public policy argument.
Id. at 479, 388 A.2d at 605.
249. An insurer may write coverage for punitive damages yet still contend that the cov-
erage is unenforceable due to public policy considerations. In Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Goldfarb, 53 N.Y.2d 392, 425 N.E.2d 810, 442 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1981), a health care provider
was held, on public policy grounds, not entitled to indemnification for punitive damages flow-
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C. California's Broad Public Policy Negation of Insurability For
Punitive Damages
Although other jurisdictions have split on the issue whether in-
surance may cover liability for punitive damages, California has
adopted the rule that they are not insurable.2 50 Two reasons for non-
insurability have been advanced in California: first that Insurance
Code section 533 precludes insurers from indemnifying insured for
punitive damages;25' and, second, that public policy precludes shift-
ing the responsibility for satisfying a punitive damages award from
insured to insurer.2 52 Neither reason supports a blanket refusal to
allow indemnification for punitive damage awards.
1. The Statutory Exclusion
The argument in favor of deeming punitive damages to be
within the statutory exclusion recognized by Insurance Code section
533 flows frorn the treatment of section 533's "willfulness" element
and the "malice" element of the punitive damages statute2 58 as rep-
resenting identical states of mind.254 While there is equivalency be-
ing from the intentional causing of injury even though the insurance policy specifically stated
that the insurer would pay "all sums including punitive damages which the insured shall
become obligated to pay because of injury resulting from professional services rendered." Id. at
400, 425 N.E.2d at 814, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 427. Since under current legal doctrine coverage for
intentionally caused losses would be an illegal contract, the insurer is not estopped, nor has it
waived the defense of illegality, by its promise of coverage. See 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, CONTRACTS, § 442 (9th ed. 1987).
250. See Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 155, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784, 788, 642
P.2d 1305, 1309 (1982); City Prods. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 41, 151
Cal. Rptr. 494, 500 (1979). The City Products decision did state that the rule would not apply
in cases where punitive damages were imposed under a theory of vicarious liability. Indemnifi-
cation in such cases would not undermine the theoretical penal purposes of the award because
the attribution of vicarious liability rests on compensatory, not penal, purposes. See also Ford
Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 116 Cal. App. 3d 374, 172 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1981). In Central
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Prudential Reinsurance Co., 196 Cal. App. 3d 342, 241 Cal. Rptr. 773
(1987), the court held that where punitive damages were allowed under a theory of ratifica-
tion, the loss was excluded from coverage pursuant to Insurance Code section 533. Id. at 356-
57, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 781 (citing Nuffer v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 236 Cal. App. 2d 349, 45
Cal. Rptr. 918 (1965) (dicta)).
251. See City Prods., 88 Cal. App. 3d at 36-38, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98.
252. Id. at 39-40, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 498-99.
253. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(11) (West 1970 & Supp. 1989).
254. See City Prods., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979):
As above held, plaintiff was assessed punitive damages on account of its own
willful tort. An element of that tort was "malice in fact." This is clear from the
appellate opinion in which the court states that (1) "[tjhe 'malice, express or
implied,' referred to in Civil Code section 3294, 'has long been interpreted to
mean that malice in fact, as opposed to malice implied by law, is required.' "
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tween "malice" and "willfulness" in some cases,255 it cannot be gen-
eralized to exist in all cases. California courts have recognized that
the "malice" requirement for a punitive damages award can be satis-
fied where the tortfeasor exhibits "conscious disregard" for the rights
of the victim. 25 6 Where punitive damages are sustained on the basis
of "conscious disregard," there is no equivalency with the willfulness
element of section 533 since "conscious disregard" bespeaks "reck-
lessness," whereas intent connotes "willfulness." In addition, the
term "willfulness" found in section 533 has been given a narrow
construction in recent decisions as meaning a "preconceived design to
The tort of malicious prosecution connotes something more blameworthy than
an act of negligence. The chief element of a cause of action for malicious prose-
cution is malice. To constitute malice there must be a motive or purpose, and it
must be an improper one. The requirement in a malicious prosecution case is
evidence which establishes bad faith, or the absence of an honest and sincere
belief that the prosecution was justified by the existent facts and circumstances
.... 'The element of malice necessarily involves the process of the mind and
its thinking.' Malice imports willfulness; and, accordingly, in our opinion, is a
'willful act' within the meaning of section 533.
Id. at 36-37, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98 (citations omitted). But see supra note 69.
255. Malicious prosecution cases, such as presented in City Products, are examples of
situations where convergence usually exists. See, e.g., Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295
P.2d 405 (1956), in which the court noted that improper purposes sufficient to establish malice
exist in those proceedings in which:
(1) the person initiating them does not believe that his claim may be held valid;
(2) the proceedings are begun primarily because of hostility or ill will; (3) the
proceedings are initiated solely for the purpose of depriving the person against
whom they are initiated of a beneficial use of his property; (4) the proceedings
are initiated for the purpose of forcing a settlement which has no relation to the
merits of the claim.
Id. at 383, 295 P.2d at 411.
256. The California Supreme Court has recognized that, in certain circumstances, negli-
gent conduct may rise to the level of outrageous conduct and, at that higher level, support an
award of punitive damages. See Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 158-59, 642 P.2d
1305, 1311, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784, 790 (1982) ("[n]on-intentional torts may also form the basis
for punitive damages when the conduct constitutes conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others"); Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Cal. 3d 388, 650 P.2d 1171, 185 Cal. Rptr. 654
(1982). In order to justify punitive damages in such cases the evidence must show that the
defendant (1) knew of the (2) probable injurious consequences of his conduct and (3) deliber-
ately failed to avoid them. Woolstrum v. Mailloux, 141 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 5, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 729, 732 (1983).
Examples of cases which have sustained awards of punitive damages for outrageous con-
duct include: Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc., 95 Cal. App. 3d 279, 283-84, 288,
157 Cal. Rptr. 32, 34-35, 37 (1979) (Defendant, operator of a self service gasoline station, was
repeatedly advised by his employees of nozzle malfunction which caused gasoline to overflow
when the pump was used. Defendant was actually advised of people slipping and falling in the
pump area where the spillage occurred. Defendant ordered the station manager to remove
warning signs and to stop advising patrons of the hazards in the pump area). See also Wool-
strum, 141 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, at 5-6, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 731-32 (collecting cases).
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inflict injury. ' 257 The court in City Products stated that "malice in
fact" and a "preconceived design to inflict injury" are synony-
mous.2 58 In this the court was mistaken. While there is some defini-
tional similarly between the two terms, the "preconceived design"
test suggests a higher level of moral culpability and intent than is
communicated by the standard definition of "malice in fact," which
is the "wish to vex, annoy or injure another person. '2 59 A practical
joker may wish to vex or annoy the victim of the prank but that
hardly suggests equivalency with a "preconceived design to injure."
Likewise a wish to injure does not suggest equivalency with a
"preconceived design" to injure. The latter test suggests a necessary
element of premeditation which is absent from the former. Unfortu-
nately, without the gloss the normal construction would be just the
opposite; "malice" would be considered the more restrictive term
over "willfulness." This need to recognize the role reversal that has
occurred in this area by reason of the restrictive gloss given the term
"willfulness" in Peterson and Clemmer and the expansive construc-
tion given "malice" has escaped California courts resulting in the
mismatch of result and legal principles. The very words chosen by
the court to describe the proper limits of the terms "malice" and
"willfulness" suggest that the latter has a much more restrictive
meaning and role than the former.
That the terms should have distinct meanings is supported by
the role each term plays in the statute within which it is found. The
punitive damages statute and the statutory exclusion for losses will-
fully brought about do not share equal, identical goals. The purposes
of the punitive damages statute are essentially deterrent and retribu-
tive;260 the goals of the statutory exclusion, while sharing those goals
in part, must also balance the goal of indemnification. This balanc-
ing requirement is largely absent from punitive damage calcula-
tions. " ' Given the distinct role each statute plays, there is little merit
257. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text, discussing Peterson v. Superior
Court and Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Company.
258. City Prods., 88 Cal. App. 3d at 36 n.3, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 497 n.3.
259. This is the standard California jury instruction definition of "malice in fact." See
BAJI No. 6.94 (6th ed. 1977). Interestingly, the court in City Products cited BAJI No. 6.94
but ignored the definition of "malice" contained in the standard punitive damages instruction,
BAJI No. 14.72 which is, at least in part, closer to Insurance Code section 533. BAJI No.
14.72 also recognizes that "conscious disregard" may amount to "malice" for purposes of puni-
tive damages.
260. See Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d. 910, 928 n.13, 582 P.2d 980, 990 n.13,
148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 399 n.13 (1978).
261. The calculation of punitive damages is not determined by a fixed mathematical
formula. In determining the proper amount to be awarded, the trier-of-fact is to consider:
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in drawing correlations between language used in the two statutes
simply because of the presence of terminology that has received par-
allel constructions in different contexts.2 The critical issue must be
whether the public policy goals that underlie both the punitive dam-
age statute and the statutory exclusion warrant the non-indemnifica-
tion of all punitive damages awards. 6 '
The problems with justifying the refusal to allow indemnifica-
1. the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct;
2. the amount of damages necessary to have the desired deterrent effect given the
defendant's financial condition; and
3. the relationship between the award and the amount of actual damages
sustained.
Id. at 928, 582 P.2d at 990, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
The disconnection between punitive damages and compensatory goals is also evidenced by
the lack of success litigants have had in attempting to connect the two. Efforts by defendants in
mass tort cases to create plaintiff classes based on the impact of punitive damages awards on
the ability of the defendant to provide compensation for other injured victims have been unsuc-
cessful. See, e.g., In re "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D.
Cal. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robbins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983) (reversing trial court's certification of plaintiff's class at defend-
ant's request because of multiple punitive damages claims); but cf In re Benediction Prods.
Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 306 (6th Cir. 1984) (while acknowledging that district court was
not "clearly erroneous" in holding that "limited fund" may justify mandatory plaintiffs' class
action, reversed because of failure to conduct a fact-finding inquiry whether "limited fund" did
or did not exist).
262. Cf W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1942):
The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules,
and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely
the same scope in all of them runs all through legal discussions. It has all the
tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against. We find exam-
ples of it wherever we turn. Contract and tort; contract and quasi-contract; ac-
tion in rem, in personam, and quasi in. rem; title; general and special prop-
erty-all these and a hundred others furnish examples of words which more
often than not are supposed to have some one meaning, good for all purposes,
when even a small amount of observation and analysis of the phenomena of
legal decision as they occur will show the falsity of the assumption.
Id. at 159.
263. This is confirmed, at least inferentially, by the California Supreme Court's citation
in Peterson only to the "public policy" arguments raised in City Prods. Corp. v. Globe Indem.
Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979); the Peterson court's citation did not
include those pages of the City Products opinion where the semantic similarities between
"malice-in-fact" and "wilfulness" were addressed. Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147,
157 n.4, 642 P.2d 1305, 1310 n.4, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784, 789 n.4 (1982). See Foremost Ins. Co.
v. Wilks, 206 Cal. App. 3d 251, 253 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1988) (court stated that proscription on
indemnification for punitive damages awards followed from Ins. Code section 533 and Civil
Code section 1668). Ironically, while the court stated that the insurer could be held to have
waived the right not to indemnify for compensatory damages awarded against the insured as a
result of intentional misconduct, the court impliedly suggested that waiver would not apply to
a punitive damages award. The Court, in effect, acknowledged that a punitive damages award
stands on a different footing than other awards for purposes of indemnification.
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tion of punitive damages as required by Insurance Code section 533
may thus be summarized as follows:
1. The intentional act exclusion precludes indemnity for losses
resulting from a preconceived design to inflict injury; moreover
a number of California decisions equate "intent" with malice,
i.e., a wish to vex or annoy, thus, in effect collapsing Civil Code
§ 3294 and Insurance Code § 533. But
2. Conduct may be unintentional yet still give rise to punitive
damages if the conduct is carried out by the insured "with a
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." But
3. All punitive damages awards fall within the ambit of Insur-
ance Code § 533.
The punitive damage exclusion thus extends the sweep of sec-
tion 533 to unintentional conduct whenever the resulting loss is la-
beled a punitive damage award. However, the exclusion for non-
intentional punitive damages cannot rest on section 533 unless "con-
scious disregard" can be transmuted into "preconceived design,"
which clearly it cannot. Indeed "recklessness," the verbal equivalent
of "conscious disregard," implies other than an intentional act. The
decision to deny coverage to punitive damage awards cannot be justi-
fied by reliance on Insurance Code section 533; justification must
rest on other grounds.
2. The Public Policy Argument Against Indemnification For
Punitive Damages
As noted previously, jurisdictions are divided on the issue
whether it is against public policy to allow indemnification for puni-
tive damages. 64 Jurisdictions which refuse indemnification accept
one or more of the following arguments: (1) indemnification defeats
the purpose of punitive damages which is to make an example of
defendant and thereby deter him and others from engaging in so-
cially reprehensible conduct; (2) indemnification serves no useful
purpose because punitive damages are a windfall for the plaintiff; or
(3) indemnification would allow the burden of the penalty to fall on
the innocent insurer, its shareholders and policyholders through in-
creased premiums.2 66 Jurisdictions which permit indemnification
reason: (1) courts should generally not interfere with private con-
tracts unless manifestly necessary; (2) the insured has paid and the
264. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text and infra notes 279-82.
265. See City Prods., 88 Cal. App. 3d at 39-40, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 498-99.
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insurer has received payment for the coverage; (3) the reasonable
expectations of the policyholder are that she is covered for all dam-
ages awarded up to policy limits; (4) punitive damages do not really
deter and compensatory damages do not really compensate; and (5)
increased premium costs that would accompany indemnification for
punitive damages are an equivalent deterrent to the punitive dam-
ages award itself.266
The arguments against indemnification of punitive damages are
similar in many respects to those made against punitive damages in
general. 267 Since California allows punitive damages to be assessed
but not indemnified, the distinction must be based on reasons that
are not common to the two situations or which, if common, demand
different resolutions.
One argument that is not common to both situations is based on
the nature of insurance. An insurer must be able to calculate within
reasonable bounds the expected loss in order to arrive at an appro-
priate premium that will cover the insurer's costs (losses plus ex-
penses, such as underwriting, claim adjustment, etc.) and provide the
insurer with a reasonable profit. Thus, it might be argued that in-
demnification for punitive damages should not be permitted because
it jeopardizes the fiscal integrity and solvency of insurers.268 The in-
surer may not be able to calculate the risk because punitive damage
awards are assessed with reference to such inconstant variables as
wealth and the culpability of the defendant. Calculating punitive
damages is a fluid process not subject to rigid guidelines.26 9 Yet, the
same arguments could be made for a number of damage awards for
which insurance is available, such as, lost profits, pain and suffering.
While the observation is correct that indemnification for punitive
266. See, e.g., Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522
(1972); Greenwood Cemetery, Inc., v. The Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 232 S.E.2d
910, 913-14 (1977); First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 389 A.2d 359 (Md. App.
1978); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218, 397 N.E.2d
737, 422 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1978); State of Vermont v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 404 A.2d 101, 105
(Vt. 1979). See also supra note 235, noting Professor Ellis' compensation justifications for
punitive damages.
267. See Woolstrum v. Mailloux, 141 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 5, 190 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1983) (where the court chronicled the most common arguments made against allowing puni-
tive damages).
268. See Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the
Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1961) (insurance provides security for
policyholders; regulation of insurers is designed to ensure continued security). Insuring insurer
solvency has been a major if not primary reason for regulation of insurers in California. See 1
CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 1.02[4][a], at 1-18 (1986).
269. See, e.g., Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC Jeep/Renault, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 3d 381,
387-90, 202 Cal. Rptr. 204, 208-10 (1984). See supra note 261.
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damages complicates the ability of insurers to calculate risk, there is
no objective proof, that, for purposes of risk calculation, punitive
damages are different in kind from other types of difficult to quan-
tify damage or that allowing indemnification of punitive damages
would threaten the fiscal integrity of insurers. Insurers who did not
want to assume such an indemnity obligation could do so by a plain
and conspicuous exclusion of punitive damages, rather than relying
on a public policy known to all insurers but only a few insureds.
The very fact that many insurance policies provide coverage for pu-
nitive damages, even if only where imposed on a theory of vicarious
liability, undermines the fiscal solvency argument.
A second argument is that since punitive damages are designed
to deter and punish, allowing indemnification would be at cross pur-
poses to those goals. This argument appears to be the principal one
relied upon by California courts.""0 Although the argument has some
appeal, 71 it is ultimately an unsatisfactory justification for the broad
punitive damages exclusion recognized by California courts. The
statutory exclusions (Insurance Code section 533 and Civil Code sec-
tion 1688) speak to deterring willful acts. While it cannot be gain-
said whether denying indemnification really deters, it is clear that
the purpose of the exclusion is to deter willful acts not non-inten-
tional conduct. The mere fact that conduct poses a high risk to
human safety has not been deemed by the majority of courts to pre-
clude insurability, even when the risk is to third parties.272
It is paradoxical to proscribe insurance on a deterrence ration-
ale for one type of conduct simply because the resulting damages are
labeled punitive rather than compensatory. Perhaps, if there was a
strong sense in the legal community that punitive damages only pun-
ished and properly discriminated between the careless and the heart-
less, then a case for distinguishing, for insurability purposes, be-
tween compensatory and punitive damages might be made. If the
decision to deny insurability for punitive damages awarded in the
context of non-intentional, conscious disregard conduct is in fact
based on the purpose of the penal remedy, this suggests that all non-
compensatory remedies ought to be uninsurable, such as treble dam-
age awards, "presumed" damages, civil sanctions, etc. Courts have,
270. See Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 157 n.4, 642 P.2d 1305, 1310 n.4,
181 Cal. Rptr. 784, 789 n.4 (1982); Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 116 Cal. App. 3d 374,
172 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1981).
271. See Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 116 Cal. App. 3d 374, 172 Cal. Rptr. 59
(1981).
272. See supra note 169 and accompanying text and supra notes 184-89.
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however, treated these types of damages as insurable.27 8 The ration-
ale of these decisions is that mandatory enhanced damages are pri-
marily compensatory.2 74 Yet, in analogous settings courts have recog-
nized that mandatory enhanced damages serve a penal function. 75 It
appears that treble damages can be either penal or compensatory de-
pending on the immediate wishes of the court. The punishment and
deterrence rationales prove too much. Punishment and deterrence re-
main theoretical goals of the whole of law. Classification of losses as
insurable or not based on whether there was a related goal of pun-
ishment or deterrence would sweep many losses into this exclusion-
ary "black hole."
Since the legislature has addressed the public policy issues of
indemnification for willful acts in Insurance Code section 533 and
Civil Code section 1688, judicial intrusion into the area ought to be
circumspect.2 7' Deterrence is but one of the many purposes that lie
at the heart of law. Whether the theoretical deterrent effect of puni-
tive damages would be undermined by allowing indemnification is a
matter better left to legislative determination than judicial specula-
273. See, e.g., California Shoppers, Inc v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 1,
221 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1985) (treble damages not excludable under Insurance Code section 533).
274. Id. at 34, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 187. See also Cieslewicz v. Mutual Servs. Casualty
Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 104, 267 N.W.2d 595, 601 (1978) (Insurance coverage for statutory treble
damages not violative of public policy. Statutory and common law punitive damages differ in
that statutory punitive damages (1) do not require a particular state of mind, (2) are automati-
cally imposed, and (3) are fixed in amount without regard to wealth of the defendant.); Miller
v. Continental Ins. Co., 40 N.Y.2d 675, 358 N.E.2d 484, 389 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1976); cf In re
National Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool, 636 F. Supp. 1138, 1152-55 (C.D. Cal.
1986) (review of the case law indicated that there is no clear-cut distinction in the cases as to
whether antitrust and RICO treble damages are penal or remedial). On the compensatory
aspects of common law punitive damages, see Fagot v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342, 344-45
(E.D. La. 1978).
275. Cf Gomez v. Volkswagen, Inc., 169 Cal. App. 3d 921, 928-29, 215 Cal. Rptr.
507, 512-13 (1985) (treble damage provision of consumer 5rotection statute essentially penal
and preempts punitive damages claim based on violation of statute); SuperTurf, Inc. v. Mon-
santo Co., 660 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1981) (treble damages under antitrust court and punitive
damages under parallel state law court are duplicative).
276. While the regulation of insurance falls to both the legislature and judicial branches
of government, it is generally conceded that the identification and establishment of "public
policy" most properly belongs to the legislative branch. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Cocking, 29
Cal. 3d 383, 628 P.2d 1, 173 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1981). See also K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING
RISK 126-29 (1986) (noting that judicial action should be circumspect of legislative and regula-
tory primacy except in situations where the insurer's action misleads the insured as to the
scope of coverage). The legislature is capable of acting in this area as evidenced by its adoption
of California Insurance Code section 533.5 which prohibits insurance coverage for the pay-
ment of any fine, penalty or restitution in any civil or criminal action or proceeding brought by
specified law enforcement entities. CAL. INS. CODE § 533.5 (West Supp. 1988). The statute by
its terms does not apply to private disputes.
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tion. At present, the only legislative declaration in this area regard-
ing "intentional acts" is that contained in Insurance Code section
533. No provision in the Insurance Code suggests that the public
interest would be harmed if punitive damages, based on non-inten-
tional conduct, were insurable. Nor should insurers, who purport to
write coverage for such damages, be allowed to escape from the bar-
gain with impunity because of a public policy argument which by its
very terms is inapplicable to non-intentional conduct, but is applied
to such conduct nonetheless. While it may be conceded that judicial
delineation of public policy may permissibly expand on legislative
pronouncements,2 77 that expansion should be consistent with the leg-
islative scheme and in furtherance of the basic legislative policy. Cal-
ifornia courts have yet to demonstrate that the blanket prohibition on
indemnification for punitive damages awards is consistent with the
public policies underlying either Insurance Code section 533 or Civil
Code section 3294, much less both. Rather, as demonstrated above,
the blanket prohibition does not vindicate the legitimate goals that
underlie the awarding of punitive damages; however, it does subject
insureds to the full cost of imperfect verdicts and insured misjudg-
ments that lead to penal awards in private disputes.
When the punitive damages exclusion was first developed, there
was a strong correlation between the "willful act" requirement of
Insurance Code section 533 and the "malice" concept in Civil Code
section 3294. Every California court that has purported to exclude
punitive damages from coverage has relied on this one-to-one corre-
lation. No California court has purported to exclude punitive dam-
ages solely on the basis of public policy apart from Insurance Code
section 533. Subsequent judicial decisions extended the "malice" con-
cept of punitive damages to include "conscious disregard for the
health and safety of another." Since, from a remedial perspective, the
tort system undercompensates many individuals injured by the mis-
conduct of others, it is not difficult to treat the "conscious disregard"
standard as substantially compensatory, and as a way of providing,
more complete compensation to those who were injured by conduct
highly likely to injure. 78 Conduct undertaken in conscious disregard
277. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 1, § 6.4(a), at 646 stating:
More often and more explicitly than was common [in] earlier times, courts ...
may look to the state's legislation not only with.'the purpose of faithfully apply-
ing the specific statutory mandates, but also as sources of 'establishment of pol-
icy [that] carries significance beyond the particular scope of each of the statutes
involved. (citation omitted).
278. Cf Ray v. City of Detroit, 67 Mich. App. 702, 704, 242 N.W.2d 494, 495 (1976)
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of the health and safety of others is inherently more likely to result
in injury to others. Looking at damages awarded for injury resulting
from conscious disregard conduct as substantially compensatory
means that the public policy exclusion does not have a strong claim
for application.
The answer to the question whether punitive damages should
be insurable is neither clear-cut nor easy. There is strong appeal to
the basic proposition that punitive damages should punish and
thereby deter and that the effect of both punishment and deterrence
will be softened if the insured can obtain indemnification of the
award. Yet, that argument also requires acceptance of the assump-
tion that triers-of-fact are infallible, that punitive damages are never
awarded in contexts where the real delict is that the principal failed
to supervise an employee or exercised poor judgment, or lack of
judgment, in approving the employee's conduct, or the defendant was
extremely careless in his regard for the safety of others. Moreover,
the punishment and deterrence argument assumes that a state has
only one public policy. "Public policy" is not a talisman or magic
touchstone. Unfortunately, California courts have not evidenced a
willingness to analyze the issue of the insurability of punitive dam-
age awards in terms of the multiple "public policies" that are in-
volved here, most importantly the basic pro-coverage policy based on
the fact that the insurer has accepted a premium and implicitly rep-
resented to the insured that damages are covered.
Few observers of the legal system should be so sanguine of the
perfectibility of the adjudicative process as to assume that errors in
awarding punitive damages do not occur and that the errors are
greatest in the cases involving non-malevolent conduct. 279 The efforts
("[exemplary damages are those] recoverable for injury to feelings and for the sense of indig-
nity and humiliation resulting from injury maliciously and wantonly inflicted"). Other reasons
have been advanced for allowing punitive damages that are quasi-compensatory: (1) encourag-
ing plaintiffs to bring actions that might otherwise be discouraged due to cost and inconve-
nience of proceedings; and (2) providing a substitute for personal revenge. See Hensley v. Erie
Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 233 n.15 (1981) (collecting cases); see also, Ellis, supra note 235.
Even if it is assumed that tort remedies in theory fully compensated a victim, the general
requirement that the victim bear the costs of securing his or her compensation means that, in
actuality, full compensation is not achieved.
279. All judgments are in fact statements about the probability that certain events oc-
curred. See Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14
VAND. L. REV. 807 (1961); Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U.
CHI. L. REv. 34 (1979); McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242
(1944); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1329 (1971). Because the probability is always less than one, inevitably an incorrect
decision may be reached. The incorrect decision may, of course, favor the insured, but the basic
point is that the insured should be entitled to protect itself against the possibility of an errone-
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on the part of the California Supreme Court to tighten the willful-
ness standard of Insurance Code section 533 so that it only excludes
losses brought about through the insured's "preconceived design to
inflict injury" can be explained, in large part, as an effort to give
insureds the benefit of the doubt in the very fluid area where cover-
age turns on ascertaining "intent."
In considering whether coverage for punitive damages ought to
be allowed, courts should avoid giving the term "punitive damages"
undue symbolic significance. Punitive damages are available in a
wide variety of contexts, many of which do not involve conduct that
could be said to amount to a "preconceived design to inflict injury."
Inasmuch as neither the California courts nor the California legisla-
ture have seen fit to limit punitive damage awards to "preconceived
design to injure" cases, there is clearly a discontinuity in treating
such awards as violative of a public policy against insurability. 80
The net effect of discarding the blanket prohibition on coverage for
punitive damages would be to return insurance law to the position
that existed before the expansion of liability for punitive damages by
the adoption of the "conscious disregard" standard. Coverage would
turn on the insured's intent in committing the act that led to the loss,
not on the remedial theory used to compensate or encourage the
plaintiff to initiate litigation. This distinction is generally recognized
in the case law acknowledging the insurability of punitive damages.
While a few decisions broadly hold that punitive damages for inten-
tional torts are insurable,28' the vast majority of courts have an-
nounced their relaxation of the public policy bar in cases factually
ous determination of liability. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 517-
28 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing the impact of legal error on substantive rules and litigation deci-
sions); Edwards & von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Inplicationsfor the Law,
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1986) (identifying common systemic errors in decision making).
280. This discontinuity has been recognized as calling for the insurability of punitive
damage awards that are not based on intentional acts of misconduct. See Public Serv. Ins. Co.
v. Goldfarb, 53 N.Y.2d 392, 400, 425 N.E.2d 810, 815, 442 N.Y.S.2d 422, 427 (1981) (puni-
tive damages are insurable if awarded for any reason other than "intent to injure," such as for
gross negligence, recklessness, or wantonness); Mazza v. Medical Mutual Ins. Co., 311 N.C.
621, 319 S.E.2d 217 (1984) (the North Carolina Supreme Court reserved judgment whether
punitive damages could be covered, consistent with public policy, where they were related to
the insured's intentional misconduct).
281. See Koehring Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 564 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis.
1983) (malicious prosecution and abuse of process); Fagot v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342 (E.D.
La. 1978) (police liability); City of Cedar Rapids v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 304 N.W.2d
228 (Iowa 1981) (false arrest) (overruled on other grounds); First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359 (1978) (malicious prosecution); Colson v. Lloyd's of
London, 435 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (false arrest); City of Newark v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 134 N.J. Super. 537, 342 A.2d 513 (1975) (police liability).
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involving conduct not specifically found to have been intended to in-
jure.282 There is much to commend in an approach that would per-
mit coverage of punitive damages awarded where the insured en-
gaged in conduct deemed to be recklessness or amounting to
conscious disregard; yet, preserve the bar where the loss was inflicted
as a result of a deliberate design to injure.
D. Punitive Damages and Vicarious Liability
In City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co.,288 the court
suggested that the public policy against allowing indemnification for
punitive damages awards would not apply when liability for punitive
damages was vicarious.284 California's punitive damages statute does
not purport to permit attribution of punitive damages based on the
doctrine of respondeat superior.85 Under California law the princi-
pal may be made to pay punitive damages based on the act of the
agent where the principal (1) authorized the acts, (2) ratified the
acts, (3) knowingly or recklessly employed an unfit agent, or (4) em-
ployed the agent, who did the wrongful act, in a managerial capac-
282. See supra note 280; see also Employers Ins. Co. v. Brock, 233 Ala. 551, 172 So.
671 (1937); Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972);
California Union Ins. Co. v. Arkansas Louisana Gas Co., 264 Ark. 449, 453, 572 S.W.2d 393,
395 (1978); Whalen v. On-Deck, Inc., 514 A.2d 1072 (Del. 1986); Greenwood Cemetery, Inc.
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 316, 232 S.E.2d 910, 913 (1977); Abbie Uriguen Olds-
mobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 507, 511 P.2d 783, 789
(1973); Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969); Continen-
tal Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1973); Anthony v. Frith, 394 So. 2d 867, 868
(Miss. 1981); First Bank v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Mont. 1984);
Mazza, 311 N.C. at 624, 319 S.E.2d at 219; Harrell v'. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199,
216, 567 P.2d 1013, 1021 (1977); Morrell v. Lalonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A. 438 (1923), cert.
dismissed sub nora. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrell, 264 U.S. 572 (1924);
Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964); State v.
Glens Falls Ins. Co, 137 Vt. 313, 319, 404 A.2d 101, 105 (1979); Lipscombe v. Security Ins.
Co., 213 Va. 81, 85, 189 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1972); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 168 W. Va 172,
183, 283 S.E.2d 227, 233 (1981); Brown v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 446, 369 N.W.2d 677,
688 (1985).
283. 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979).
284. Id. at 35-36, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 496-97. The court did not apply the rule because it
found that the punitive damages were based on the corporation's own willful act.
285.
It is apparent from the foregoing that under California law the imposition of
punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault. It is not im-
posed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others. The "malice in fact," which
was the foundation of the punitive award against plaintiff, was malice of plain-
tiff acting through its corporate official "having the power to bind the corpora-
tion" who, in contemplation of the law, constituted plaintiff itself.
Id. at 36, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
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ity. 86 Where punitive damages are awarded against the principal
based on his authorizing the agent to commit the wrongful act, there
is little question but that the principal's conduct was willful within
the purview of Insurance Code section 533. Here authorization is
legally analogous to that where the insured commits a willful injury
himself. Much more difficult are the situations where punitive dam-
ages may be assessed against the principal because of ratification,
knowing employment of unfit agent or commission of wrongful con-
duct by a managerial employee.
In California, punitive damages have been upheld on the mere
retention of the agent by the principal after the principal knew or
had the opportunity to know of the agent's misconduct. 87 Attribu-
tion of liability on such grounds falls far short of the "preconceived
design to injure" test that is the basis of Insurance Code section 533.
Similarly, what constitutes "knowing employment of an unfit agent"
can run the gamut from positive misconduct (i.e., hiring the known
vicious thug to repossess cars) to negligence (i.e., failing to appreciate
the agent's erratic behavior). 88 A per se rule excluding indemnifica-
tion amounts to overkill. Likewise the managerial test imposes liabil-
ity on another (the entity or its owners) based on the acts of a partic-
ular class of agents. Confusion results because the determination of
who is a manager is fluid. Whether an agent acts in a managerial
capacity depends on "the degree of discretion the employee pos-
sess[es] in making decisions that will ultimately determine corporate
policy."'289
In an analogous setting the Alaska Supreme Court recognized
the propriety of allowing indemnification:
The purpose of punitive damages is twofold: to punish the
wrongdoer and to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from
repeating the offensive act. Assuming, without deciding, that
public policy in Alaska would prohibit liability insurance cover-
age for punitive damages, we hold that such a policy would not
286. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(b) (West Supp. 1988).
287. See Pusateri v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 180 Cal. App. 3d 247, 253, 225 Cal. Rptr.
526, 530 (1986). This retention amounts to ratification of the wrongful conduct. Under such
circumstances the ratifying insured may lose any coverage for the punitive damages award. See
supra note 250; see also Hale v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 42 Cal. App. 3d 681, 691-92, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 146, 153-54 (1974), disapproved on other grounds in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 822 n.5, 598 P.2d 452, 459 n.5, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 489 n.5 (1979),
appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 912 (1980).
288. See Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155, 1161
(Okla. 1980).
289. See Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 822-23, 620 P.2d at 148, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
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prohibit municipal corporations from insuring against punitive
damage awards. Such awards are incurred in the performance
of public functions and, if uninsured, would fall on the innocent
taxpayers. Further, where the liability is vicarious, or the de-
fendant is a governmental entity, there exists a considerable
body of decisional authority to the effect that liability insurance
coverage of punitive damage awards is allowed. We view this
exception to the general prohibition against insurance coverage
of punitive damages as a sound one and find the rule an appro-
priate basis for the disposition of this issue on appeal.2 90
The fact that punitive damages may be assessed against one
whose liability is secondary and whose culpability often falls far
short of any specific intent to injure suggests that the public policy
against indemnification is not the same as is the case with the actual
wrongdoer. In situations where punitive damages are the conse-
quence of some neglect other than commission or authorization of the
wrongful act, the policies in favor of indemnification and the specu-
lative deterrent value of punitive damages favor allowing indemnifi-
cation. Providence Washington Insurance Co. and the general poli-
cies underlying vicarious liability support the use of insurance to
protect the interests of innocent shareholders and innocent insureds
against imprudent actions by others. The fluidity and flexibility
which accompany the determination of the liability of principals for
punitive damages for acts committed by their agents prevent any
meaningful claim that such damages are always and necessarily
awarded because the insured principal harbored a preconceived de-
sign to injure. Denial of indemnification in such cases simply
amounts to the giving of an allegiance to the deterrence and punish-
ment goals that is neither warranted in theory nor consistent with
what lawyers and judges know juries do, and don't do, in actual
practice. Insurance should be allowed to protect insureds from the
adversities visited on them in the real world-a world of imperfec-
tion and error.29 The protection insureds pay for should not be de-
290. Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. City of Valdez, 684 P.2d 861, 863 (Alaska
1984) (footnote omitted).
291. For example, as noted previously at supra note 287, a principal has a duty to
repudiate unauthorized acts of the agent and failure to do so may evidence approval or ratifica-
tion. On the other hand, where the agent's special skills and experience are necessary to the
employer's business, retention may not amount to ratification. See Sullivan v. Matt, 130 Cal.
App. 2d 134, 144, 278 P.2d 499, 506 (1955). The employer is clearly put in a difficult position
where exposure to punitive damages may turn on an erroneous decision regarding the skill and
experience of the agent as it relates to the employer's business. It seems that this is just the
type of decision that should be insurable.
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nied based on artifice and unnecessary fictions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Surveying the California decisions addressing the intentional act
exclusion reminds one of the old legal aphorism: "The rule has been
consistently followed and the only difficulty has been in applying it."
The determination to exclude from insurability losses intentionally
brought about or inflicted has manifested itself in many ways. With
the core concept, there is little disagreement. An insured who, har-
boring the actual intent to injure or create a loss, follows through
and causes that loss to arise should not be able to negate statutory
and policy exclusions that deny coverage for such losses. The critical
issue, however, is how far from the core concept courts should go in
allowing the intentional act exclusion to perform the task that could
be accomplished by a specific exclusion. One theme that emerges in
the decisional law applying the intentional act exclusion is that once
outside the core concept, the decisions become inconsistent both in
their results and reasoning. To some extent this must be expected.
Decisions in the penumbra cannot be expected to have the internal
consistency and closeness to the reasons for creating the doctrine as
do cases in the core. A certain amount of inconsistency is a tolerable
price in situations where the decision to go outside the core is itself,
in general, reasonable and warranted. The difficulty here, however,
is that the principled decision to leave the core, and the terms and
conditions under which the journey will be made has not been made
by decision makers in this area. Rather, the intentional act exclusion
has evolved spontaneously and without plan or design. Nor can we
now look at the results of fifty years of unplanned development and
say that, serendipitously, all came out all right in the end. The in-
tentional act exclusion has evolved into a misshapen doctrine that
like a "banjo" hitter at the plate, sometimes hits, usually misses, and
rarely accomplishes anything significant except to make an out.
Fortunately, a little pruning can restore consistency, logicality,
and purpose to this area of the law. The basic test of Clemmer that
the exclusion is only activated when the insured "harbors a precon-
ceived design to injure" states a workable, fair test. It certainly serves
any legitimate underwriting interest that insurers possess. To the ex-
tent successful underwriting depends on the convenient certainty that
arises when fortuity is spread across a large number of similar risks,
excluding losses caused by "preconceived design" preserves fortuity.
What is important is that the related issues of "intent," mental
capacity, and the issue of coverage for punitive and penal awards be
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tied to the test in actuality rather than in pretense. Use of the
"preconceived design" test would certainly force insurers to rethink
and, most likely, rewrite several clauses in the insurance contract. If
insurers wanted broad or blanket exceptions for punitive damages
awards, sexual assault injuries, etc. the insurance policy would have
to expressly so provide. Explicit disclosure of the limitations on in-
surance coverage is much the preferable approach over the current
system that allows the generic concept of intentional act exclusion to
dictate whether certain losses are insured or not. The consequence of
this ambiguous system of coverage is that much turns on largely for-
tuitous events, such as the presence of an innocent co-insured the
existence of a large pain and suffering award rather than a punitive
damages award, as the determinants of coverage.
The legitimate purposes of an intentional act exclusion are pun-
ishment and, more importantly, deterrence. The first purpose re-
quires that the insured's conduct be sufficiently blameworthy in a
legal and moral sense to warrant the imposition of punishment and
that the fact of punishment have economic reality. The second pur-
pose suggests that coverage only be negated where the consequence
of denying the applicability of the intentional act exclusion (loss in-
demnity) is outweighed by the conviction that the conduct sought to
be deterred is controllable by the insured and sufficiently socially un-
desirable to justify placing the full cost of the decision (no indemnity)
on the insured and the victim. It is suggested that the Clemmer test
appropriately identifies the few situations where the values of "pun-
ishment" and "deterrence" are sufficiently real to justify the negation
of indemnity.
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